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WHAT IS DISCRIMINATORY INTENT?
Aziz Z. Huq†
The Constitution’s protection of racial and religious groups
is organized around the concept of discriminatory intent.  But
the Supreme Court has never provided a crisp, single defini-
tion of ‘discriminatory intent’ that applies across different in-
stitutions and public policy contexts.  Instead, current
jurisprudence tacks among numerous, competing conceptions
of unconstitutional intent.  Amplifying the doctrine’s complex-
ity, the Court has also taken conflicting approaches to the
question of how to go about substantiating impermissible mo-
tives with admissible evidence.
The Court’s pluralistic view of intent is in theory plausible,
and perhaps even unavoidable.  But its lack of any consistent
approach in practice to the question of how to sift and weigh
different sorts of evidence of unconstitutional motive is not
defensible.  Rather, the current doctrinal apparatus for discov-
ering discriminatory intent has hidden regressive effects: It
subtly and silently moves evidentiary burdens between differ-
ent plaintiffs and between different defendants.  The resulting
case outcomes are likely to shape the way in which the public
perceives the extent and nature of unconstitutional discrimina-
tion.  This perceptual effect, in turn, compounds and en-
trenches the doctrine’s regressive distributive effects.
In lieu of current arrangements, I propose a revised doctri-
nal framework that acknowledges conceptual pluralism in the
constitutional law of antidiscrimination, while encouraging
courts to acknowledge frankly and manage responsibly that
conceptual diversity.  It also reorients the evidentiary frame-
work for demonstrating discriminatory intent to mitigate the
presently distorted allocation of judicial resources.
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INTRODUCTION
“Discriminatory intent” is a central term in the judicial
interpretation of constitutional clauses requiring the equal
treatment of persons without regard to their race, ethnicity, or
religion.1  There is nothing inevitable about this.  The centrality
1 See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1479 (2017) (discussing how
an intent standard is met); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1831
(2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (concurring in the rejection of a challenge to peti-
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of intent is not apparent from the text of the First Amendment’s
Religion Clauses or the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protec-
tion Clause.2  And it is quite possible to imagine a jurispru-
dence of constitutional equality for natural persons that does
not hinge upon the subjective psychological state of the defen-
dant state actor—even if it still relies on some conception of
discrimination as a means to implement the abstract ideal of
equality.3
The central role of intent in the doctrinal framing of indi-
vidual rights against unconstitutional discrimination is a sur-
prisingly recent doctrinal innovation.  As late as 1971, the
Supreme Court in Palmer v. Thompson could claim to find “no
case in this Court [holding] that a legislative act may violate
equal protection solely because of the motivations of the men
who voted for it.”4  The Palmer Court’s statement, to be sure, is
carefully calibrated.  It carefully skirted prior judicial account-
ings of legislative intent in early twentieth-century federalism5
and Establishment Clause6 domains.  It also put to one side
prior judicial challenges to the racially discriminatory actions
tioner municipality’s use of prayer at the beginning of official meetings by noting
that the mistake was at worst careless and not done with a discriminatory intent);
see also Paul Gowder, Racial Classification and Ascriptive Injury, 92 WASH. U. L.
REV. 325, 333–34 (2014) (“Plaintiffs must show either by direct evidence or by
inference that the state intended to bring about segregation—a state policy that
merely causes segregation, without such intent, is not subject to challenge.”).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); U.S. CONST.
amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
3 For a leading example of such a theory, see Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). See also Alan David
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A
Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052–55 (1978)
(criticizing the role of “fault” and “causation” in antidiscrimination law for pre-
cluding relevant inquiries).
4 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971).  For a similar statement in the First Amendment
Free Speech domain, see United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)
(quoting McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904)), saying that “[t]he
decisions of this Court from the beginning lend no support whatever to the as-
sumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the
assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be
exerted.”
5 See, e.g., Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S.
20, 38 (1922) (taking the “intent” of Congress to be pivotal when invalidating a tax
on the products of child labor).
6 See, e.g., Board of Ed. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (looking at the
“purpose” of a measure to ascertain compliance with the Establishment Clause);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453 (1961) (holding that a state law violates
the Establishment Clause if “its purpose—evidenced either on the face of the
legislation, in conjunction with its legislative history, or in its operative effect—is
to use the State’s coercive power to aid religion”).
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of specific officials.7  Nevertheless, it captures a surprising, and
now largely forgotten, skepticism about the role of intent when
interpreting the Constitution’s protections for vulnerable mi-
nority groups.
We know now, of course, that the Palmer Court’s intent
skepticism would prove evanescent.  In the same Term it was
abjuring intent in Palmer, the Court doubled down on the role
of improper, non-secular purpose in Establishment Clause ju-
risprudence.8  The Justices subsequently underscored in no
uncertain terms that officials must not act on the basis of a
preference for one religious denomination.9  Two years after
Palmer, Equal Protection jurisprudence respecting race began
to change course when the Court, in a critical school desegre-
gation case, flagged its attentiveness to any potential imper-
missible “purpose or intent to segregate.”10  Then, three years
after that, the landmark decision of Washington v. Davis held
that a “discriminatory racial purpose” was “necessary” to state
an Equal Protection violation.11  The last piece of the doctrinal
mosaic to fall into place concerned the Free Exercise Clause.
Long focused on the disparate effect of neutral laws on religious
believers,12 it pivoted sharply in the early 1990s to a new stan-
dard in which discriminatory intent played a central role.13  As
7 Cases that are difficult to explain without accounting for intent include
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960), which invalidated an oddly
shared boundary drawn around the city of Tuskegee as motivated by race; and
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969), which invalidated a housing ordi-
nance that placed “special burdens” on racial minorities.  Indeed, some of the first
Equal Protection cases concerned discriminatory enforcement of the law. See
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (invalidating conviction of a Chi-
nese national prosecuted in a pattern of discriminatory enforcement of a San
Francisco ordinance concerning laundries).
8 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (imposing a “secular
purpose” requirement).  In fact, the use of intent and purpose in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence goes back at least to the direction in Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947), that the state may not “prefer one religion over
another.”
9 See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982) (condemning a state rule
because of its “express design—to burden or favor selected religious
denominations”).
10 Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
11 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
12 See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (holding that gov-
ernment has an obligation to create laws that are neutral in their application to
different religions).
13 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 533 (1993) (holding that “if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict
practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral”); see also
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (upholding criminalization of penal-
ties on ceremonial use of peyote, but flagging that there was “no contention that
Oregon’s drug law represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs”).
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a result, intent now plays a central role whenever an individual
litigant invokes the Constitution’s protection against official
discrimination because of race, ethnicity, or faith.
But what does it mean to say that an official action is
motivated by a ‘discriminatory intent’?  And how can litigants
in practice prove up an allegation of improper motivation?
These simple questions turn out to have complex answers. For
the federal judiciary has not homed in upon a single definition
of discriminatory intent.  Nor has it developed a consistent ap-
proach to the evidentiary tools through which discriminatory
intent is substantiated.14  Instead, studied ambiguity in doctri-
nal formulations means that judges have a large measure of
discretion when resolving constitutional discrimination cases.
Their leeway flows from an ability to tack between different
conceptions of discrimination. It also follows from an ability to
select among various evidentiary mechanisms by which its al-
legation can be substantiated.
My aim in this Article is to offer a map of discriminatory
intent’s competing definitional and evidentiary strands.  By
demonstrating the complexity of definitions and courts’ fickle
approach to questions of proof, I develop the basis for a critique
of the way in which those threads are presently woven to-
gether—and a new way forward.
The idea that simple doctrinal terms can mask deep disa-
greement is hardly new.  While few should be surprised that
‘discrimination’ has been productive of dissonance, an illustra-
tive range of the divergent judicial approaches to questions of
proof is helpful to motivate the analysis.15  Three are from the
Supreme Court.  One is from a state trial court, but it so use-
fully illustrates a rarely litigated legal question about discrimi-
nation that I include it here too.
First, in March 2017, the Supreme Court rejected a long-
standing prohibition on any post-trial inquiry into juror behav-
ior in holding that a Colorado trial court should have allowed
testimonial evidence that a juror “relied on racial stereotypes or
animus to convict a criminal defendant.”16  The dissenting Jus-
tices agreed that such discriminatory intent was pernicious
and unconstitutional, but argued that the stability of the com-
14 See infra subpart II.F.
15 My analysis focuses on constitutional, rather than statutory, antidis-
crimination jurisprudence.  Different frameworks of burden shifting have devel-
oped in the statutory jurisprudence, and the kinds of evidentiary issues
addressed in Part III that arise in considering government action do not arise.
16 Pen˜a-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
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mon-law rule against impeaching jurors outweighed the costs
of verdicts tainted by such intent.17  Had the dissenters pre-
vailed, criminal cases where a biased juror does not reveal her
bias until the eve of verdict would have lacked any forum for
airing of discriminatory intent’s role in securing a conviction.
Second, and mere weeks later, the Court invoked statistical
evidence, public statements, and the trial testimony of state
legislators to hold that the use of race as a proxy for partisan
affiliation in North Carolina’s legislative redistricting violated
the Equal Protection Clause.18  No Justice even blinked at the
use of trial testimony this time.  Nor did they abjure statistical
evidence—even though similar evidence had previously been
repudiated in the criminal context as evidence of improper ra-
cial intent.19  But, unlike the jury bias case, the Court did not
suggest that a litigant needed to point to the presence of stereo-
types or other negative views in order to trigger constitutional
scrutiny.  The kind of intent the Court searched for seemed
different.
Third, a few months after the North Carolina judgment, a
Minnesota jury issued a verdict of acquittal in the nationally
watched manslaughter trial of police officer Jeronimo Yanez,
related to his shooting of African-American motorist Philando
Castile.20  Although race loomed large in public debate about
the incident—one of many high-profile police shootings of Afri-
can-Americans—the prosecution’s case rested on evidence
from an expert in police use of force21 and featured neither
testimonial nor empirical inquiries into Officer Yanez’s poten-
tial biases.  For instance, jurors heard nothing about experi-
mental psychology data that points toward a persistent but
unconscious racial differential in police’s willingness to
shoot.22  As a result, the trial process marginalized the poten-
17 Id. at 875 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court is surely correct that even a
tincture of racial bias can inflict great damage on that system . . . .”).
18 See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1475 (2017).
19 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–93 (1987) (rejecting the use of
statistical evidence to allege racial bias in the administration of capital sentences).
20 See Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile,
N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-
shooting-trial-philando-castile.html [https://perma.cc/T2KQ-M8PU].
21 See Sarah Horner, Witness Testimony from the Jeronimo Yanez Trial: A
Summary, MINNEAPOLIS STAR (June 15, 2017), http://www.twincities.com/2017/
06/15/yanez-trial-with-jury-in-4th-day-of-deliberations-heres-what-witnesses-
said-at-trial/ [https://perma.cc/TL87-YACV].
22 For a recent summary of those studies, see Joshua Correll et al., The Police
Officer’s Dilemma: A Decade of Research on Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 8
SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 201, 207 (2014), which concluded, on the
basis of several experimental studies, that police have a “prepotent tendency to
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tial role of race in police violence cases by omitting statistical
evidence about how race can influence use-of-force decisions
below the surface.
Finally, ten days later, the Court took up another legal
dispute about the role of constitutionally sensitive classifica-
tion.  That case concerned an executive order issued by Presi-
dent Trump imposing limitations on travel to the U.S. by
nationals of six Muslim-majority nations.23  Because the so-
called travel ban was challenged on Establishment Clause
grounds for establishing a religious preference, the case
presented the question of whether public statements by a pres-
idential candidate presaging a policy decision targeting Mus-
lims could be introduced in a challenge to a policy action widely
understood as (and arguably explicitly embraced as) the dis-
criminatory one promised during the campaign.24  Despite the
Court’s reliance on government actors’ public statements in the
North Carolina case mere months beforehand, the Government
strenuously insisted that looking at candidate Trump’s state-
ments would be improper—ensuring that the most powerful
evidence of impermissible motive be kept at bay—and, of
course, calling for the case to be resolved without the Presi-
dent, unlike Officer Yanez, testifying.25
These cases—all from a single four-month period in 2017—
suggest some disarray in the ways by which discriminatory
intent can and must be proved.  Official statements, statistics,
extrinsic circumstances, and the routine tools of discovery,
such as depositions and interrogatories—all these float in and
out of judicial view.  Adding to the confusion, the cases pivot on
quite different conceptions of discriminatory intent.  Bias,
these precedents suggest, can be open and obviously invidious;
it can be neutral and functional in orientation; it can be a
matter of the classifications used by state actors in reaching a
decision; or it can be implicit and unconscious, a function of a
state actor’s implicit reliance on invidious background social
structures.
shoot” African-American subjects, but explored ways to manage this tendency
through training.
23 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
24 See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2086 (2017)
(per curiam).  The Court here used a declarative statement to the effect that such
campaign statements are not admissible.  But the statement is embedded in a
larger discussion of the government’s position and is thus not plausibly read as a
stand-alone holding.
25 See id.
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It should not surprise that ideas of ‘discrimination’ and
‘discriminatory intent’ would prove so controversial and diffi-
cult.  Those concepts are closely entangled with notions of
equality, and it has long been clear that the latter is “it-
self . . . many distinct notions, each an element in its gram-
mar.”26  Moreover, a recent wave of philosophical reflection on
the term discrimination has revealed a range of possible under-
standings of the term.  These efforts do not necessarily lead to a
focus on individual intent in the sense familiar to lawyers and
legal scholars.  Deborah Hellman, for example, has identified a
class of “demeaning” classifications applied in the context of
power asymmetries as the core moral wrong of discrimina-
tion.27  Benjamin Eidelson concurs that “core cases of wrongful
discrimination” involve acts that “manifest disrespect for the
discriminatees as persons.”28  In contrast, Tarunabh Khaitan
has argued that the “point” of antidiscrimination law is “to
secure an aspect of the well-being of persons by reducing the
abiding, pervasive, and substantial relative disadvantage faced
by members of protected groups.”29  In somewhat similar
terms, Sophia Moreau offers a more liberty-oriented account of
antidiscrimination law as the protection of “deliberative free-
dom” to make decisions about how to live “insulated from pres-
sures stemming from extraneous traits.”30  When sophisticated
exegetes of the moral right of discrimination diverge so widely,
we should expect that Justices, walled apart by their own parti-
san and jurisprudential disagreements, will also come to vest a
single term with many different meanings.
My aim is not to adjudicate between competing philosophi-
cal accounts of discrimination.  Nor do I want to simply casti-
26 DOUGLAS RAW ET AL., EQUALITIES 132 (1981).  A different version of this point
is Peter Westen’s celebrated argument that equality, in the legal context, derived
its meaning wholly from extrinsic sources.  Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 542 (1982) (contending that “the idea of equality is
logically indistinguishable from the standard formula of distributive justice”).
27 See DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 29–35 (2008).  For a
crisp formulation of Hellman’s nuanced claim, see Deborah Hellman, Equal Pro-
tection in the Key of Respect, 123 YALE L.J. 3036, 3046–47 (2014), explaining that
“discrimination is wrong when it is demeaning,” and that “[d]emeaning has two
parts, which [she] call[s] the expressive dimension and the power dimension.  An
action, policy, or practice demeans if it expresses that the person or people af-
fected are less worthy of equal concern or respect and if it is the action, policy, or
practice of a person or entity that has the power or capacity to put the other
down.”
28 BENJAMIN EIDELSON, DISCRIMINATION AND DISRESPECT 6 (2015).
29 TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 91 (2015).
30 Sophia Moreau, What Is Discrimination?, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 143, 147
(2010).
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gate the Justices for their inconstancy (a pointless task).
Instead, I hope to provide a clear mapping of how the slippery
concept of ‘discriminatory intent’ works in practice, and a new
perspective on the distributive consequences of that practice.
To that end, the Article maps out the two sources of judi-
cial discretion in constitutional doctrine intimated by my open-
ing examples.31  The first involves the kind of discriminatory
intent that is alleged.  The second concerns the manner in
which it is proved or refuted in different institutional contexts
through admissible evidence.  Both these questions—of defini-
tion and of proof respectively—are consequential in practice.
How courts translate and then implement the general idea of
discriminatory intent determines how and when norms embed-
ded in the First and Fourteenth Amendments check official
action.32  By carefully parsing the answers to these ‘what’ and
‘how’ questions, I hope to refine our understanding of the nor-
31 In order to keep the analysis manageable, I focus here on constitutional
law, and not on the statutory law of discriminatory intent.  For one analysis of
relevant federal statutes that addresses some of the same theoretical issues, see
Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs,
and the ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399 (2006).  More generally, the employment discrimi-
nation literature is focused on defining the ‘right’ kind of intent for statutory
liability. Compare David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141
U. PA. L. REV. 899, 915–19 (1992) (advocating a negligence standard), with Ste-
phanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1059 (2017)
(advocating a recklessness model), and Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Stat-
utes, the Common Law, and Proximate Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 13–14
(suggesting that a negligence standard has not been adopted).  This is a distinct
normative inquiry from the taxonomical analysis I pursue here.
32 My analysis here is focused on the Constitution’s norms of antidiscrimina-
tion that protect vulnerable social groups based on suspect classifications such
as race and religion.  “Discriminatory intent” is relevant in other doctrinal con-
texts—but the relevant conceptions of bias in those other fields is narrower and
more specific and, therefore, does not raise the same concerns of conceptual
pluralism and evidentiary approach as the Equal Protection Clause and Religion
Clauses.  For example, the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause is violated if an
official acts “out of a desire to prevent . . . First Amendment [activity].”  Heffernan
v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016).  Other than this reference to the
narrow idea of retaliatory intent, however, Free Speech has tended to avoid doctri-
nal tests that direct judicial attention narrowly to motivation.  Justice Elena Ka-
gan, though, has argued that First Amendment doctrine “comprises a series of
tools to flush out illicit motives and to invalidate actions infected with them.”
Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996).  Even Kagan,
however, does not contend this function is explicit in doctrinal formulations or
that judges directly ascertain the motives of official actors. Id. The Dormant
Commerce Clause, in contrast, is tailored around a more discrete concern with
“regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests.”  Wyoming
v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
This conception of discrimination is also relatively narrow in comparison to the
more complex conceptions at work in the Equal Protection and Religion Clause
contexts.
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mative choices implicit in the present doctrine—and in particu-
lar to identify its distributive consequences for different
ascriptive groups.
Consider first what the term ‘discriminatory intent’ means
when it comes to traits such as race, ethnicity, alienage, and
gender.33 The term is often used almost interchangeably with
words like motivation, purpose, and animus.34  It can profita-
bly be understood to encompass legal theories of antidis-
crimination which account for the mental state of the alleged
malefactor.  Intent is hence commonly viewed as distinct from,
and even at war with, a consequence-focused conception of
disparate impact.35  In this Article, I use the term ‘discrimina-
tory intent’ to capture any theory of antidiscrimination liability
that turns in any way upon the cognitive processes of the al-
leged discriminator. Importantly, this includes rules that look
to the semantic content of the rules that the alleged discrimina-
tor applied.  Thus, my taxonomy and analysis capture as much
of the law as possible.  This allows me to consider the extent to
which core conceptions of discrimination are related to what at
first blush might seem to be unrelated concepts, such as a
‘colorblind’ anticlassification rule.  I conclude, perhaps a touch
counterintuitively, that the norm of colorblindness is appropri-
ately understood as a rule against a certain kind of discrimina-
tory intent.
With that in mind, the seemingly simple concept of dis-
criminatory intent can be disaggregated into at least five dis-
33 The idea of discrimination also arises under the Dormant Commerce
Clause. See, e.g., S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 169 (1999)
(holding a state tax on capital stock unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause
because it “facially discriminates against interstate commerce”).  But the kind of
discrimination at issue in Dormant Commerce Clause cases is distinct and differ-
ent from the kind at issue in Equal Protection and First Amendment cases.  The
former is a species of economic dealing, most often by legislatures directed at a
large group of faceless nonresidents not modeled as possessing any distinctive
traits.  The gap between this notion of discrimination and the notion at stake in
the Equal Protection and First Amendment contexts is sufficiently large that it
seems unwise to conflate the concepts.
34 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (describ-
ing the bare desire to harm as an “improper animus or purpose”); Lyng v. UAW,
485 U.S. 360, 370 n.8 (1988) (characterizing such motives as “illegitimate”).
35 See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round
Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 495 (2003) (identifying the possibility that “equal
protection might affirmatively prohibit the use of statutory disparate impact stan-
dards”).  There are also conceptual approaches to antidiscrimination law that
align disparate treatment and disparate impact as two means of achieving the
same goal. See Noah D. Zatz, Disparate Impact and the Unity of Equality Law, 97
B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1359–60 (2017) (arguing that a form of “status causation”
underpins both species of liability).
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tinct theoretical strands.  First, perhaps the most intuitive
meaning of discriminatory intent is action taken as a result of
“a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular
group,”36 or another aversive view of the group.
Second, a suspect classification might be used not out of a
desire to harm, but because it is deemed a more efficient
source of information about how to achieve a licit goal than
readily available alternatives. This too can trigger constitu-
tional scrutiny.37  Race, for example, might be thought to pre-
dict partisan identity.  Or, religion can be taken as a proxy for
terrorism risk.38
A third possibility is that a discriminatory intent is present
on any occasion upon which the relevant criterion plays a role
in government decision making.  This is often known as an
“anticlassification” principle.39  The latter is easy to concep-
tualize as hinging on the semantic content of the law, and not
the quality of the decision maker’s intentions.40  But it is a
mistake to think of anticlassification as exhausted by a con-
cern with the facial content of the law.  The logic of anticlassifi-
cation, I will argue, is also necessarily concerned with the
quality of official intentions, above and beyond the content of
legal texts.
Fourth, an impermissible classification can work as a
marker of the boundary between two hierarchically arranged
social groups even when applied in a seemingly neutral and
evenhanded way.  This ‘social group polarization’ approach il-
luminates several early decisions concerning laws that formally
applied in evenhanded ways. Yet it is rarely mentioned now.
Finally, a prohibited classification might play a subtler
psychological role—one that the official in question might not
immediately recognize because of implicit bias or the culpable
36 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
37 See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 n.1 (2017) (“A plaintiff
succeeds at [the first stage of the analysis] even if the evidence reveals that a
legislature elevated race to the predominant criterion in order to advance other
goals, including political ones.”).
38 Notice that this is distinct from the idea that a licit trait might be employed
as a proxy for an impermissible criterion.
39 Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition:
Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) ( “[T]he
anticlassification . . . principle holds that the government may not classify people
either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category: for example,
their race.”).
40 Cf. id. (identifying intentional discrimination as a supplement case that
might “also” count as a violation of the anticlassification principle, rather than a
core case).
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failure to account for structural inequalities.41  These forms of
reckless or negligent action are analogous to bad intent in ways
that make them appropriate subjects here, falling just within
the perimeter of my analytic reach.
These different conceptions of discriminatory intent are, to
be sure, difficult to distinguish sharply.  They have fuzzy, over-
lapping boundaries.  Rather than frankly recognize plurality
and overlapping conceptualizations of discriminatory intent,
however, federal courts treat the concept as unitary.42 The re-
sult is that judges retain considerable discretion to move be-
tween different versions of discriminatory intent.  How this
discretion is exercised, I will argue, can and does raise sub-
stantial normative questions.  This is because the way in which
judges exercise their discretion can hinge upon their subjective
evaluations of the importance of different discrimination-re-
lated harms.  Worse, the weight of different harms often seems
to depend on the identities of the perpetrator and the state
actor.  Paradoxically, antidiscrimination law can itself have a
discriminatory cast.
There is a second reason why the jurisprudence of discrim-
inatory intent remains unpredictable and incoherent in prac-
tice.  There are a number of ways to prove the presence of
discriminatory intent.  Five evidentiary tactics stand out.43
First, a judge might look at the superficial, semantic con-
tent of a decision—the text of a law or an executive order, for
example.  Second, they might look to the oral statements of the
relevant decision maker.  Third, that decision could be situated
in its context by looking upstream at the sequence of events
leading up to its execution and then downstream to its conse-
quences.  This context may well provide powerful circumstan-
tial evidence of an improper motivation.  Fourth, in some cases,
the motivations of the relevant government actor can be di-
rectly probed using the well-worn instruments of civil discov-
ery, such as depositions and interrogatories.  Fifth, a judge
might consider statistical evidence derived from an
econometric analysis to the effect that an impermissible classi-
fication played a role in government decision making.
Despite having embraced all of these evidentiary instru-
ments at one moment or another since the mid-1970s, when
41 See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Im-
plicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 473–75 (2010) (discussing the
pervasiveness of implicit, unconscious biases).
42 See infra Part II.
43 See infra Part III.
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intent was first coming into its doctrinal ascendancy, the Court
has since backpedaled—albeit in fits and starts. It has showed
no overt recognition that changes in the kinds of evidence
available to show bias lead inexorably to changes in the kinds
of bias that can successfully be challenged in court.44  Its un-
theorized and sub rosa reorientation of constitutional antidis-
crimination law should provoke concern not only because that
change has been subject to no careful judicial or academic
scrutiny, but also because it has operated as a subterranean
way of changing the reach and coverage of the Constitution’s
foundational protections for vulnerable minorities.
This matters because the idea of discriminatory intent
plays a large role in many contemporary policy flashpoints.  It
bubbles to the surface of national debate over the so-called
travel ban, the persistence of police violence against African-
American men and women,45 and the cyclic resurgence of con-
testation about affirmative action.46  More generally, recent
events in the public sphere have demonstrated that even the
most naked and virulent forms of animus continue to mar the
American body politic.47  Their influence on officials empow-
ered with the enormous discretionary authorities of today’s
government cannot be dismissed out of hand.  In this context,
rigorous and fair-minded thinking about how to define and
discover discriminatory intent is surely needed more than ever.
My focus on the concept of discriminatory intent, and the
mechanics of its substantiation in court, is a departure from
the literature’s dominant concerns.  There is now abundant
scholarly commentary on what might be called the grand theo-
ries of equality or religion threading through the Constitu-
tion.48  Questions of how discriminatory intent is defined and
44 See infra Part IV.
45 See Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in
Police Use of Force (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22399,
2016) (identifying racial disparities in use of police force, but not police shootings).
46 See Charlie Savage, Justice Dept. to Take on Affirmative Action in College
Admissions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/01/
us/politics/trump-affirmative-action-universities.html?hpw&rref=us&action=
click&pgtype=Homepage&module=well-region&region=bottom-well&WT.nav=bot
tom-well [https://perma.cc/DH3S-UPBQ] (noting renewed interest among politi-
cal branches for enforcing limits on affirmative action).
47 See id.
48 In respect to the Equal Protection Clause, important recent scholarship
focuses on overarching goals and broad, synoptic judgments. See, e.g., Russell K.
Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 154 (2016) (contending that
“the Supreme Court has steadily diminished the vigor of the Equal Protection
Clause in most respects”); Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equality Divided, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Siegel, Equality Divided].  A number of recent articles,
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proved tend to be ancillary and subordinate to a larger critique
of the ideological orientation of the doctrine.49  In contrast, the
only extended study of the manner by which judges discover
discriminatory intent is almost twenty years old.50
My argument proceeds in four steps.  Part I begins by
charting the ascendency of discriminatory intent as a touch-
stone of liability under the Equal Protection and Religion
Clauses.  The following Part develops the claim that ‘intent’ is
however, critique specific elements of the judiciary’s framework for implementing
the idea of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products:
Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 183 (discussing the four deci-
sions that form the foundation of the “anti-animus doctrine” of Equal Protection).
In addition, Richard Fallon has offered a searching critique of the idea of legisla-
tive intent more generally. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden
Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523 (2016).  My discussion of impermissible
intent in the legislative context overlaps in focus with Fallon’s piece.  My aim,
however, is to understand how judicial scrutiny of legislative intent interacts with
judicial scrutiny of other officials’ motivations under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.  In contrast, recent Religion Clause scholarship focuses on precise
doctrinal questions related to the hotly contested question of accommodations
from generally applicable laws, see Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience
Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J.
2516 (2015), and the status of corporate entities, see Elizabeth Sepper, Free
Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1469–70 (2015).
49 One recent major contribution, by the Critical Race theorist Ian Haney-
Lo´pez, argues that the Justices have “split equal protection into the separate
domains . . . one governing affirmative action and the other discrimination against
non-Whites” in a move that has made it systematically easier for white plaintiffs to
prevail.  Ian Haney-Lo´pez, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1828
(2012).  He asserts that the Court has “rejected inquiring into the thoughts of
individual government actors.” Id. at 1795.  He also harshly criticizes the turn to
intent and the refusal to distinguish remedial from “oppressive” race-conscious
measures. Id. at 1805–06, 1815–16.  Unlike Haney-Lo´pez, I do not aim here to
critique the Court’s conception of Equal Protection.  Indeed, I read the doctrine as
remaining more open and pluralistic than he does.  Moreover, unlike him, I focus
on the shifting conceptual and evidentiary methods under the rubric of discrimi-
natory intent as the causal mechanism through which the focus of the courts has
shifted.
50 See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Su-
preme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L. REV. 279, 284 (1997).  Selmi’s central claim is
that “the Court has only seen discrimination, absent a facial classification, in the
most overt or obvious situations—situations that could not be explained on any
basis other than race.” Id.  Whereas Selmi focuses on the narrowing of the intent
inquiry, my aim is to explore the range of definitional, analytic, and empirical
options at play in the judicial discernment of discriminatory intent.  Another
earlier article critiques the counterfactual method of ascertaining unlawful intent
as impossible to implement. See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal
Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1113–14 (1989).  In my view, the counterfactual
method for analyzing discriminatory intent is simply a way of framing the ques-
tion whether unlawful intent is at work, and not a way of answering that question.
Finally, a recent student note draws on conceptions of intent from psychology to
argue for treating foreseeable harms as intentional.  Julia Kobick, Note, Discrimi-
natory Intent Reconsidered: Folk Concepts of Intentionality and Equal Protection
Jurisprudence, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 517, 519–20 (2010).
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not a singular concept, but better understood as encompassing
an array of different possibilities.  It offers an analytically ge-
neric typology of meanings.  Part III catalogs the evidentiary
instruments available for identifying impermissible motives.
One inference that follows from the taxonomy is negative:
There is no neutral way of putting into practice the idea of
discriminatory intent.  As in any craft, the choice of tools
changes the nature of the ultimate product.  Normatively
freighted choices are simply unavoidable.  The final Part pivots
to a critique of the Court’s observed choices on the basis of
their distributive and epistemic effects.  That is, it examines the
way in which the Justices’ choices allocate scarce judicial re-
sources between different victims of discrimination, and the
way in which they shape public understanding of discrimina-
tion’s moral harm.
I
THE RISE AND RISE OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
This Part maps the emergence of discriminatory intent as a
touchstone of jurisprudence under the Equal Protection Clause
and the Religion Clause.  My account of Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence focuses largely on race, where the key
precedents were handed down.  But I also draw upon case law
about other suspect classifications and fundamental rights in-
sofar as they are pertinent to the story.
A. The Equal Protection Clause
Enacted later, but liquidated in court more quickly than
most other elements of the Constitution’s text, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment generated a juris-
prudence of intent within the first two decades of its
ratification—at least in respect to administration of the laws, if
not to legislation.51  There was nothing inevitable about this
doctrinal move.  The Court’s first major interpretation of the
Clause, in the 1880 case of Strauder v. West Virginia, did not
hinge on intent.52 Strauder concerned a state statute that lim-
ited jury service to “white male persons who are twenty-one
51 The leading accounts of the Equal Protection Clause’s adoption emphasize
the divergence of views among those who debated and adopted the measure. E.g.,
WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDI-
CIAL DOCTRINE 126, 131 (1988); John P. Frank & Robert F. Munro, The Original
Understanding of “Equal Protection of the Laws”, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 421, 432
(1972).
52 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880).
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years of age.”53  Invalidating the conviction of an African-Amer-
ican man under this regime, the Court found a failure of formal
equality on the face of the statute that violated the Constitu-
tion’s “immunity from inequality of legal protection.”54  It was
the “statute” rather than any person, the Court explained, that
“discriminat[ed]” in the sense of unevenly extending the protec-
tion of state law.55  Later cases suggested that the complete
exclusion of African-Americans from juries could be prima facie
evidence of a constitutional violation.56  Defendants hence were
constitutionally entitled to introduce evidence of such exclu-
sion.57  But the analytic reach of jury exclusion cases did not
enlarge much before the Court imposed stringent evidentiary
requirements that in practice foreclosed Strauder challenges.58
Such interactions between substantive laws and evidentiary
protocols were to prove an important element in the story of
Equal Protection doctrine, and a central pivot of my story here.
Seven years after Strauder, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the
Court was presented with a habeas petition from a Chinese
national convicted under a San Francisco municipal ordinance
regulating the licensing of laundries.59  Although the petitioner
attacked the ordinance both on its face and as applied, the
Court considered solely the motives behind the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.60  In particular, the Justices focused
on the selective enforcement of the ordinance against Chinese
laundry owners as evidence of the “hostility to the race and
nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in the
eye of the law, is not justified.”61  Absent evidence of discrimi-
natory intent, the Court clarified in a sequel case—again one
involving evenhandedness in the enforcement of San Francisco
53 Id. at 305 (citation omitted).
54 Id. at 310.
55 Id. For an extension of this logic, see Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584
(1883), which rejected a challenge to a statute that imposed higher penalties on
interracial rather than intraracial fornication because “[e]quality of protection
under the laws implies not only accessibility by each one, whatever his race, on
the same terms with others to the courts of the country for the security of his
person and property, but that in the administration of criminal justice he shall
not be subjected, for the same offence, to any greater or different punishment.”
56 See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1881).
57 See Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 449 (1900).
58 Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination: The
Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1462–63 (1983).
59 118 U.S. 356, 356–57 (1886).
60 See id. at 373–74.
61 Id. at 374.
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ordinances—that no Equal Protection challenge would stand.62
Strauder and Yick Wo thus reflect distinct doctrinal potentiali-
ties embedded in the Equal Protection Clause.  They were harb-
ingers of a concern about classification and a concern about
animus, respectively.63
Yick Wo’s immediate implications were stifled by the fed-
eral judiciary’s endorsement of state-enforced segregation.
This culminated, of course, in Plessy v. Ferguson.  While not
disavowing Yick Wo, the Plessy Court blocked any inquiry into
the motives of state actors by suggesting that any “badge of
inferiority” flowing from segregation arose “because the colored
race chooses to put that construction upon it.”64 Plessy thus
undercut arguments about official intent by placing blame for
racial stratification on “social prejudices” and the “general sen-
timent of the community,”65 as if these had nothing to do with
law.  Since the Justices then likely approved of racial segrega-
tion as public policy,66 they were hardly likely to perceive an
improper motive at work in Louisiana’s segregation of railroad
passengers by race.67
Only in the late twentieth century, as the Court worked
though the implications of the majestic opacities of Brown v.
Board of Education,68 did the idea of discriminatory intent
come to the fore once more. Brown repudiated Plessy’s conclu-
sion that de jure segregation had no direct impact on African-
62 See Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 507–08 (1905) (noting that petitioner
had failed to show that there were non-Chinese-owned establishments that had
been spared enforcement).
63 The theme of normative pluralism runs through the best historical scholar-
ship on the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment. See Alexander M. Bickel, The
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 63
(1955) (finding in the enactment history of the Fourteenth Amendment “no spe-
cific purpose going beyond the coverage of the Civil Rights Act is suggested; rather
an awareness on the part of these framers that it was a constitution they were
writing, which led to a choice of language capable of growth.”); see also DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS
1789–1888 at 349–50, 349 n.143 (1985) (suggesting that the Equal Protection
Clause was understood initially only to apply to “remedial” or “protective” func-
tions of state government).  One consequence of the diversity of original public
understandings of the Fourteenth Amendment is that there is necessarily a mea-
sure of interpretive space for doctrinal pathways as diverse as Strauder and Yick
Wo.
64 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
65 Id.
66 See Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 332.
67 Hence the Court’s failure, twelve years after Plessy, even to inquire into the
motives behind a Kentucky law that prohibited integrated colleges. See Berea
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 57–58 (1908) (upholding the measure as a valid
exercise of the state’s police power in respect to corporations).
68 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Americans’ “status in the community.”69  But otherwise the
Court’s opinion in Brown did not clarify “which conception of
discrimination [the Court] embraced, or how far the principle of
[Equal Protection] extended.”70  Over the next two decades, the
ensuing desegregation litigation did not require the Court to
select a “precise identification of the objectionable aspect of
racial classifications.”71  Only when the city of Jackson, Missis-
sippi, closed its public swimming pools to stymie court-ordered
integration was the Court confronted with a state action clearly
motivated by an improper animus yet simultaneously even-
handed in its semantic content and effect.72  A closely divided
Court held in Palmer v. Thompson that the “bad motives” of the
measure’s legislative supporters did not bear on its
constitutionality.73
This rule did not endure.  Faced with a turn by lower courts
to a disparate impact standard,74 the Court in 1976 in Wash-
ington v. Davis held that “the basic equal protection principle
[is] that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discrimi-
natory purpose.”75  Much criticized even at the time, Washing-
ton explicitly rested on a concern about the destabilizing effects
of a constitutional effects rule.  But the fact that the Court had
a clear idea of what it disfavored did not mean it understood
the alternative that it was embracing.76  Indeed, because the
69 Id. at 494.
70 David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 935, 947 (1989) [hereinafter Strauss, Discriminatory Intent].
71 Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90
MICH. L. REV. 213, 296 (1991).
72 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
73 Id. at 225.  For early critical commentary that anticipated later judicial
criticisms, see Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95.
74 See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 959–60 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
rev’d sub nom. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (remarking “that use of
selection procedures that do not have a disparate effect on blacks would have
resulted in an even greater percentage of black police officers than exists today”);
Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Members of the Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm., 482
F.2d 1333, 1337 (2d Cir. 1973) (requiring that plaintiffs show a sufficient “dispar-
ity between the hiring of Whites and minorities”).
75 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
76 Id. at 248 (“A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is neverthe-
less invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens
one race more than another would be far-reaching and would raise serious ques-
tions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes . . . .”); see also Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S.
222, 229 (1985) (striking down a racially neutral felon disenfranchisement law
enacted by the Alabama constitutional convention in 1901 because the law had
been motivated by a “zeal for white supremacy”).  For early criticism, see Theodore
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Justices in Washington faced a record with no evidence of such
invidious purpose,77 they had no need to do more than reject a
disparate impact standard (albeit without necessarily rejecting
evidence of a disparate impact as probative of a discriminatory
intent).  They thus had no need to reckon with the different
ways an impermissible classification or animus might figure in
a decisional process.
Over time, ambiguity about the precise nature of the dis-
criminatory intent that lay at the heart of an Equal Protection
violation became generative rather than paralyzing.  Without
the encumbrance of a fixed point of analytic departure, the
Court wrought a doctrinal framework in which subtly distinct
notions of intent could play a role.  Within the race context, for
example, the Court increasingly devoted its scare resources to
the government’s use of “race-based measures” that classified
using race on their face.78  Any occasion on which “the govern-
ment distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual
racial classifications,” the Court cautioned, “would lead to
‘strict scrutiny.’”79  In contrast, in the context of rules that
overtly classify by gender, after some wobbling,80 the Court
settled into the practice of querying whether a legal distinction
is “in reliance on ‘[s]tereotypes about women’s domestic
roles . . . .’”81
Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional
Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977).
77 To the contrary, the case involved a personnel test administered by the
Washington, D.C. police department, and the record contained evidence of the
“affirmative efforts of the Metropolitan Police Department to recruit black of-
ficers.” Davis, 426 U.S. at 246.
78 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); see also
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (“Federal racial
classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental inter-
est, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.”).
79 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
720 (2007); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (describing the
use of such classifications as “pernicious” (citation omitted)).
80 For example, the Court held that pregnancy discrimination in state insur-
ance coverage fell outside the compass of Equal Protection, justified by the asser-
tion that there was “no risk from which men are protected and women are not.”
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1974). Geduldig failed to inquire into
stereotypes or impermissible intent, placing it in the category of disparate impact
cases (although one that was wrongly decided even on those terms).
81 Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1693 (2017) (quoting Ne-
vada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003)); see also Schles-
inger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (expressing similar concern about laws
based on “archaic and overbroad generalizations”); see also Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (expressing that “something
more than accident is necessary to justify the disparate treatment [of women] who
have as strong a claim to equal treatment as do similarily situated surviving
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In the absence of an overt classification, the Court’s ap-
proach to allegations of improper bias against minorities oscil-
lated, yielding inconsistent results across cases.82  In one line
of cases that did not involve the application of strict scrutiny, it
emphasized that “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpop-
ular group” necessarily clashed with the Equal Protection
Clause.83  These cases varied in subject-matter, touching on
voting, fiscal distributions, and the taxation of out-of-state car
purchases.  And they rested on a variety of rationales, includ-
ing the lack of “a legitimate and specific explanation” or the
presence of “stereotypic assumptions or hostility toward a
class.”84  Hence, the doctrinal framework for the evaluation of
discriminatory intent seems to vary depending on whether a
formal classification, a stereotype, or an unexplained hostility
is perceived to be at work.
Nor did the cases that followed immediately on Washington
v. Davis’s heels resolve the question of what evidence could be
used to prove bad intent.  Instead, the Court initially took a
sweeping view of the kinds of evidence admissible to demon-
strate discriminatory intent85—an element of the doctrine I
shall explore at greater length below—and a narrow view of
whether the Constitution was violated in cases of mixed mo-
spouses.”).  The intent requirement in gender Equal Protection jurisprudence has
traveled a crooked path.  Klarman, supra note 71, at 304 (noting the “apparently
chaotic” character of the early gender jurisprudence).  Five years after Washington
v. Davis, for example, the Court upheld California’s statutory rape law against a
challenge that it discriminately targeted men alone. See Michael M. v. Superior
Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 471–72 (1981).  Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Rehnquist parenthetically noted the petitioner’s argument that the stat-
ute “rests on archaic stereotypes,” but rejected this contention with a citation to
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). Michael M., 450 U.S. at 472
n.7.
82 See infra subpart II.B.
83 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985)
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973)); see also Lyng v.
UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 370 n.8 (1988) (characterizing such motives as “illegitimate”).
The Court also uses the term “animus” to capture the same idea. See United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (describing the bare desire to
harm as an “improper animus or purpose”); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 634 (1996).
84 Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 489
(2004) (collecting cases).
85 See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 266–68 (1977) (demanding a “sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and
direct evidence of intent as may be available,” including the impact and the
history leading up to the decision); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496–97
(1977) (accepting mathematical evidence to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination).
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tives.86  Uncertainty rapidly became apparent in the Court’s
handling of how allegations of unconstitutional bias against a
protected group were proved up.  Unguided by any disciplining
procedure or logic, the Court could oscillate abruptly between
cases.
An example of such inconsistency in the treatment of cir-
cumstantial evidence of bad intent is found in two cases
wherein at-large voting systems were challenged as tainted by
discriminatory intent.  One of these cases elicited a studied
refusal to account for the circumstantial evidence of intent,87
while the other generated a careful tallying of relevant clues.88
Unsurprisingly, the two cases also yielded different results.
In sum, while the idea of “discriminatory intent” has served
since 1976 as an organizing principle in Equal Protection juris-
prudence, the Court has not hewed to a clear and specific
understanding of such “intent,” or a single understanding of
how it is to be proved.  Whereas some lines of cases underscore
the distinctively negative or aversive quality of unconstitutional
purposes, other lines of cases turn on the stereotypical content
of the government’s intent.  Yet other lines of cases make the
assumption that the mere presence of race as a criterion in a
process of government decision-making suffices to trigger a
constitutional worry.  Even within the bounds of Equal Protec-
tion jurisprudence, therefore, the idea of an unconstitutionally
discriminatory intent has become remarkably plural since
1976.
B. The Religion Clauses
Government motive—in particular, the intention to dis-
criminate either for or against religion, or else between denomi-
nations—has loomed large since the inception of
86 See Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (proof of discrimina-
tory purpose requires showing that the government decision-maker “selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in
spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”). Feeney thus narrowed
the kinds of intention that counted for the constitutional purposes by excluding
cases in which racial effects were anticipated but not intended.  Some commenta-
tors treat the case as a ruling on the evidence that can be used to demonstrate
unlawful intent.  Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 48, at 19.  But Feeney does
not preclude the evidentiary use of a law’s consequences to gauge intent.  Rather,
it directs that certain kinds of intent are not inconsistent with the Constitution.
87 City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 73 (1976) (describing evidence of bias
as most tenuous and circumstantial). But see Selmi, supra note 50, at 310–11
(pointing out persuasive evidence of “the perpetuation of an all-white local elec-
tion scheme in Mobile” that was available to the Court but ignored).
88 Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 625–26 (1982) (carefully accounting for
evidence of bias and invalidating Burke County, Georgia’s redistricting scheme).
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence.89  It has also come to
play an increasing pivotal role in Free Exercise cases since the
early 1990s.90  As in the Equal Protection context, the Court
has identified the government actor’s intentions as analytically
pivotal, rather than the consequences of its actions or its im-
pingement on some fixed and discernable “immunity” under
the Constitution.91  As in the Equal Protection context, the doc-
trinally relevant sense of ‘intent’ consistently reflects some kind
of binary opposition in which religion (or a particular denomi-
nation) is either favored or disfavored.  In some iterations, the
psychological and processual quality of the term ‘intent’ frays,
ceding ground to a more objective-seeming inquiry into an ex-
ternally determined ‘purpose.’  Still, the doctrine at its core
maintains, albeit as one element of many, an intuition that
certain motivations are unconstitutional because they entail
discrimination on religion-related grounds.92
As of the beginning of 1947, the Supreme Court had de-
cided only two Establishment Clause cases.  But neither left
any enduring impact upon the law.93  In its first major engage-
ment with the Clause, the Court upheld that year, a decision by
Ewing Township, New Jersey, to provide free transportation to
all non-profit schools, including sectarian ones.94  In influen-
tial dicta, the Court spelled out a synoptic understanding of the
Clause that prohibited certain measures based on their effect,
and in particular, whether they “aid one religion, aid all reli-
gions, or prefer one religion over another.”95  Fourteen years
later, upholding Maryland’s Sunday closing laws, the Court
89 See, e.g., Corbin, infra note 92, at 306 (explaining that motives behind
government action are only illegitimate if there is “a discriminatory intent to
devalue or exclude minority religions”).
90 See id. at 303 (explaining that after a 1990 case, Employment Division v.
Smith, “neutral laws of general applicability, regardless of the impact they may
have on a religious practice, do not violate the Free Exercise Clause” because they
lack discriminatory intent).
91 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 55 (1913) (“[A]n immunity is one’s
freedom from the legal power or ‘control’ of another as regards some legal
relation.”).
92 My reading of the doctrine differs from others who find intentionality only
in very recent Supreme Court doctrine. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Inten-
tional Discrimination in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 67 ALA. L. REV. 299,
304 (2015) (dating the role of intent in Establishment Clause analysis to the 2015
case of Town of Greece v. Galloway).
93 Both involved federal spending on sectarian institutions. See Quick Bear
v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (discussing sectarian schools); Bradfield v. Roberts,
175 U.S. 291 (1899) (concerning a religiously affiliated hospital).
94 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947)
95 Id. at 15.
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subtly reformulated the doctrinal test to train upon the “pur-
pose and effect” of challenged laws.96  The Court two years later
examined the “purpose” of a Pennsylvania town’s statute man-
dating that school days begin with a Bible reading to determine
whether it was “secular.”97  And by 1971, the requirement of “a
secular legislative purpose” seemed a touchstone of Establish-
ment Clause analysis.98
In many cases, this litmus test for constitutionality re-
sulted in a close examination of the state’s proffered justifica-
tions for a statute—cases that often involved some form of aid
to sectarian educational institutions—to ascertain whether
they were pretextual, rather than an exposition of how “pur-
pose” in this context was conceptualized or ascertained.99  In
other cases, the Court disapproved of government action on the
ground that it was intended “to endorse or disapprove of
religion.”100
Purpose plays a role now in two ongoing lines of Establish-
ment Clause cases.  The first concerns the judicial analysis of
physical fixtures such as displays, statutes, and monuments
alleged to “establish” religion in a quite concrete sense.  The
leading precedent concerns the posting of the Ten Command-
ments in classrooms, but there are endless variants.101  These
cases, to be sure, do not involve a ‘discriminatory’ intent in the
sense of an invidious, negative view of a certain class.  But they
do involve an improper intention respecting religion.  They con-
96 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445 (1961).
97 See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (rejecting
proffered secular motives).  Earlier school prayer decisions had not rested on a
finding of improper purpose, but on effects. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430
(1962) (“There can be no doubt that New York’s state prayer program officially
establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents’ prayer.”).
98 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971); accord Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983); see also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977)
(stating that “[i]n order to pass muster, a statute must have a secular legislative
purpose . . . .”).
99 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(“[I]f the government, seeking to further some legitimate secular purpose, offers
aid on the same terms, without regard to religion, to all who adequately further
that purpose . . . then it is fair to say that any aid going to a religious recipient only
has the effect of furthering that secular purpose.” (citations omitted)); Walz v. Tax
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970) (endorsing proffered reasons for religious
organization tax exemptions).
100 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (quotation omitted).
101 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(“The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether government’s actual purpose
is to endorse or disapprove of religion.”); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980)
(“The pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom
walls is plainly religious in nature.”).
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cern a mental state of ‘discrimination,’ that is, in roughly the
same way as affirmative action.  The latter trigger strict scru-
tiny not necessarily because they are animated by a hatred of
Caucasians, but rather “because racial characteristics so sel-
dom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment.”102  Es-
tablishment Clause scrutiny of facial religious distinctions, by
analogy, can be understood as constitutionally suspect be-
cause such classifications are also “so seldom . . . relevant.”103
The most extended discussion of the role of the intentions
and purposes of official actors in Establishment Clause cases
can be found in a 2005 plurality decision holding unconstitu-
tional the posting of the Ten Commandments in two Kentucky
county courtrooms.104  The defendant counties had initially
posted large, prominent replicas of the Decalogue in court-
rooms.  Once these were challenged, the counties twice shuf-
fled their exhibits so as to include an increasing variety of
secular images, including the Magna Carta and the Declaration
of Independence.105
Writing for a plurality, Justice Souter rejected the counties’
submission that the idea of purpose was too inchoate to opera-
tionalize. The plurality cited cases—including Washington v.
Davis—in which purpose was a touchstone of constitutional
validity.106  “[A]n understanding of official objective emerges
from readily discoverable fact,” argued Justice Souter, pointing
to the various contextual clues that could illuminate such pur-
pose.107  At the same time, he conceded that a strategic govern-
mental actor could obscure its motive.  But this, he argued,
posed no conclusive concern.  In the Establishment Clause,
Souter explained, “secret motive stirs up no strife and does
nothing to make outsiders of nonadherents.”108
This last point is ambiguous.  It might be read to suggest
that the Establishment Clause is necessarily underenforced.
Alternatively, it might be understood to connote that the
Clause is not concerned with the content of the psychological
state of official actors, but rather with the publicly articulated
understanding of that psychological state.  In my view, the first
reading of Justice Souter’s argument is more plausible.  To
102 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016) (quoting Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989)).
103 Id.
104 See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005).
105 See id. at 851–56.
106 See id. at 861.
107 Id. at 862.
108 Id. at 863.
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begin with, as Richard Schragger has observed, “a pervasive
feature of the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
that the Court’s stated doctrine is underenforced or is irrele-
vant to a whole range of arguably pertinent conduct.”109  Jus-
tice Souter’s statement simply acknowledges that mundane
fact.
More substantively, imagine a case in which officials enact
a measure for wholly secular reasons, a measure that is rea-
sonably perceived as motivated by favor or disfavor for religion
based on official statements at the time.  Imagine further that
the officials can produce persuasive documentary evidence
that in fact secular grounds alone played a role.  It is hard to
imagine that the measure would be invalidated because of its
impermissible intent.  Rather, the question would be whether
the perceived “endorsement” of religion would constitute an
independent violation of the Establishment Clause.110
A second line of cases, in contrast, concerns measures that
draw a distinction between regulated parties based on denomi-
national affiliation.  In the seminal case in this doctrinal
strand, the Court in Larson v. Valente invalidated a Minnesota
statute that drew no facial distinction between denominations,
but rather imposed reporting requirements solely on religious
organizations that solicited more than half of their funds from
nonmembers.111  In so doing, explained the Court, the statute
inscribed “explicit and deliberate distinctions between different
religious organizations” depending on age and size.112  The
Court could have limited its analysis to the face of the statute.
Indeed, some commentators have treated Larson as a case
109 Richard C. Schragger, The Relative Irrelevance of the Establishment Clause,
89 TEX. L. REV. 583, 585 (2011) (footnote omitted).
110 For the concept of endorsement, see, for example, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring), which asks whether the state
had impermissibly “sen[t] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adher-
ents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.” See also
Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592–94 (1989) (engaging in an endorse-
ment analysis based on Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch).  Commenta-
tors have argued that the endorsement test is in decline. See Adam M. Samaha,
Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting Principles, 2005 SUP.
CT. REV. 135, 144–58.  And some Justices have vigorously attacked the endorse-
ment test on the rare occasions it has been employed to invalidate a measure with
concededly secular purposes. See Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists,
Inc., 565 U.S. 994 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
111 456 U.S. 228, 230–31 (1982) (describing Minnesota Charitable Solicitation
Act, Minn. Stat. §§ 309.50–309.61 (2017)).
112 Id. at 246 n.23.
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about “religious classifications” alone.113  But this is a mistake.
The Justices also considered the measure’s “express design—
to burden or favor selected religious denominations led the
Minnesota Legislature to discuss the characteristics of various
sects with a view towards ‘religious gerrymandering.’”114  A de-
nominational preference, Larson suggests, obtains not only
when there is facial discrimination, but also when there is an
intent or “design” to “burden or favor selected religious
denominations.”115
The path of Free Exercise doctrine has been different from
Establishment Clause doctrine.  The emergence of discrimina-
tory intent—foreshadowed somewhat in cases such as Lar-
son—came later and more abruptly.  Until the end of the
nineteenth century, the Free Exercise Clause was understood
to draw a distinction between impermissible laws that penal-
ized “mere opinion” and those that “reach[ed] actions . . . in
violation of social duties or subversive of good order.”116  Its
contemporary revival began with the 1963 decision Sherbert v.
Verner, in which the Court invalidated a South Carolina unem-
113 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of “Tests”
Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 324 (saying only that the
Court treated a religious classification as suspect).
114 Larson, 456 U.S. at 255 (citation omitted).  In other cases involving a de-
nominational preference challenge, however, the Court did limit itself to the face
of the statute. See Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 695
(1989) (reading Larson to apply to cases of “facial preference[s]”).  But other courts
have discussed Larson as a nondiscrimination rule. See Children’s Healthcare Is
a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Min De Parle, 212 F.3d 1084, 1090 (8th Cir. 2000).
115 For similar statements that seem to turn on government intent, see Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1989), explaining that “[i]t is part of our
settled jurisprudence that ‘the Establishment Clause prohibits government from
abandoning secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one religion, or on
religion as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious organization,’”
and Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 605 (1989), saying that “[w]hatever
else the Establishment Clause may mean . . . it certainly means at the very least
that government may not demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or
creed . . . .”
116 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). But see Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 114 (1943) (invalidating a municipal license tax on
the sale of religious pamphlets as an improper “condition to the pursuit of” relig-
ious activities).  It is noteworthy here that Reynolds and Murdock alike involved
religious minorities—Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses—that were at the time
subject to considerable public contempt and discrimination. See also Kelly Eliza-
beth Phipps, Marriage and Redemption: Mormon Polygamy in the Congressional
Imagination, 1862–1887, 95 VA. L. REV. 435, 440–42 (2009) (summarizing anti-
Mormon rhetoric in Congress in the 1880s); SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHO-
VAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION
(2000) (documenting violence against Jehovah’s Witnesses in the early twentieth
century).  It is telling that while the Court reached different results in those two
cases, in neither instance did it identify or discuss the possibility of a discrimina-
tory intent.
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ployment compensation statute that excluded those who de-
clined employment on a Saturday—a measure with an
unequivocal “secular purpose,” as the dissenting Justice
Harlan remarked.117
Sherbert marked the beginning of a sequence of Free Exer-
cise decisions focused on the effects of challenged laws.118  But
intent was not wholly absent from the case law.  In 1978, for
example, the Court invalidated a Tennessee prohibition on
ministers serving as delegates to a constitutional conven-
tion.119  The Court warned that “government may not as a goal
promote ‘safe thinking’ with respect to religion and fence out
from political participation those, such as ministers, whom it
regards as overinvolved in religion.”120
It was only at the beginning of the 1990s that the Court
turned away from an effects-based framework and embraced
discriminatory intent as an analytic touchstone.121  In Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, the Court rejected Free Exercise protec-
tion from the incidental burdens on religious liberty created by
neutral, generally applicable rules.122  Like Washington v. Da-
vis’s repudiation of disparate impact in the Equal Protection
context, Smith’s rejection of Sherbert’s effects test was immedi-
ately controversial.123  And as in Washington v. Davis, judicial
117 374 U.S. 398, 421 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
118 See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832 (1989) (refer-
ring to the three previous cases in which “denial of unemployment compensation
benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause”); Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n,
480 U.S. 136, 137 (1987) (“The question to be decided is whether Florida’s denial
of un-employment compensation benefits to appellant violates the Free Exercise
Clause.”); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 709 (1981) (asking “whether the
State’s denial of unemployment compensation benefits . . . constituted a  violation
of [Petitioner’s] First Amendment right to free exercise of religion”).
119 See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978).
120 Id. at 641 (emphasis added).
121 See Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1269–70
(2008) (concluding that in general the government cannot target individual relig-
ious groups in regulations, barring extraordinary circumstances).  Intent-based
tests do not exhaust the law of religious liberty.  The effects test of Sherbert
remains the nub of statutory religious freedom protections under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012). See
also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–69 (2014) (apply-
ing the RFRA to a federal mandate on employers to provide insurance plans
covering contraception).  In addition, the Court has recently suggested identified
religious institutions as bearers of a still-inchoate form of constitutional immu-
nity. See Hosana-Tabor Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 709
(2012).  Neither of these lines of doctrine hinges on intent.
122 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
123 Scholars of all stripes attacked Smith in unstinting terms. See, e.g., Doug-
las Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10–23 (deriding
the Court’s misconception of neutrality in Smith); Michael W. McConnell, Relig-
ious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 138–39 (1992) (arguing that
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rejection of an effects test hinged on the test’s potentially desta-
bilizing consequences in practice—and not the allure of a com-
peting doctrinal measure.124  Finally, just as in the Equal
Protection context, the Court did not limit instances of discrim-
ination to cases in which a racial classification was present on
the textual surface of a law.  Rather, in short order, the Court
explained that the Free Exercise Clause was equally offended
by a facially neutral measure that evinced an impermissible
intent on the part of the relevant institutional decision-maker.
Invalidating a municipal ordinance that prohibited ceremonial
animal sacrifices required by Santeria ritual, but not other like
animal killings, the Court cautioned that “if the object of a law
is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their relig-
ious motivation, the law is not neutral” but rather in conflict
with the Free Exercise Clause.125
C. Intent and the Protection of Social Groups: A Summary
In the Equal Protection and the First Amendment Religion
Clause contexts, the Supreme Court has moved from a focus
on effects to an analysis trained on government’s discrimina-
tory intent or purpose.126  In the context of race-based claims
and Free Exercise claims, it has made this move for very similar
reasons related to the potential destabilizing effects of an ef-
fects test, but with a parallel dearth of close attention to the
embraced alternative.  The Establishment Clause, in contrast,
has been characterized by attention to official purpose for
much longer and lacks the animating concern with seismic
repercussions from an effects-based rule.  As the Court has
become more politically conservative over the last few decades,
the purpose-focused strand of Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence has come under increasing pressure.  One Justice even
suggested that denominational preferences could be acceptable
provided they tracked the historical dominance of certain
Smith “gives social policy, determined by the State, primacy over the rights of
religious communities”).
124 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (worrying that “[a]ny society adopting [an effects
test for religious liberty claims] would be courting anarchy, but that danger in-
creases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs, and its
determination to coerce or suppress none of them”).  It would be too facile to
respond that the pre-history of Free Exercise jurisprudence demonstrated the
absence of such destabilization.  That the Sherbert regime had not destabilized
may well have been a result of the Court maintaining the social equilibrium by
watering down the effects test to make it palatable in practice.
125 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
531–32, 546 (1993).
126 See supra subparts I.A–B.
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faiths.127  As this pressure increases, the treatment of racial
and religious classifications is likely to diverge: whereas mea-
sures adopted to advance the interests of one race are likely to
remain subject to close constitutional scrutiny, it will probably
be easier for governments to undertake measures to promote
either religion per se or (more usually) majority faiths.  Such
measures will include moments of prayer in official government
functions,128 programs of state aid that predictably promote
sectarian institutions,129 and official representations that en-
dorse and promote religion.130  A likely corollary to this devel-
opment will be increasing space for expressions of disfavor
directed at minority faiths.
It is worth noting that this partial congruence between the
Court’s treatments of race and religion is by no means an obvi-
ous or inevitable doctrinal development.  Although religion is
sometimes enumerated as one of the suspect classifications
under the Equal Protection Clause,131 antidiscrimination
norms about race and religion have developed along doctrinally
divergent tracks.  In part, this is because the historical circum-
127 See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 889–94 (2005) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (suggesting that government need not remain neutral between religion
and nonreligion but can “acknowledg[e] a single Creator”).  To date, the rather
startling idea that government can embrace and act upon overt hostility to Bud-
dhism, Hinduism, and other nonmonotheistic faiths has yet to gain formal trac-
tion in the case reporters.
128 See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1815 (2014) (up-
holding rotating prayers at the beginning of town meetings).
129 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 653–54 (2002) (en-
dorsing school vouchers program, while acknowledging the risk that financial
incentives might skew a program toward religious schools, but ultimately con-
cluding that so long as “neutral, secular” criteria were used no constitutional
problem obtained).
130 The legal treatments of racial and religious discriminations also diverge in
respect to “how far [the Constitution] limits government in affirmatively pursuing
concerns related to religion or race.”  Joy Milligan, Religion and Race: On Duality
and Entrenchment, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 393, 396–97 (2012) (arguing that the govern-
ment has more “leeway” when it comes to religion as opposed to race).  The Court,
however, has recently started to narrow this difference. See Trinity Lutheran
Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017) (striking down
Georgia’s exclusion of religious entities from a generally available funding
program).
131 See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429, 596 (1895)
(Field, J., concurring) (suggesting that religion is a suspect classification), aff’d on
reh’g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), superseded on other grounds by constitutional amend-
ment, U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.  The issue remains unsettled in most courts of
appeals. See Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 299 (3d Cir. 2015), as
amended (Feb. 2, 2016) (“Perhaps surprisingly, neither our Court nor the Su-
preme Court has considered whether classifications based on religious affiliation
trigger heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.” (footnote
omitted)).
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stances of extreme racial stratification have had a distinctive
role in American social and political history that has no precise
religious parallel.  Even if the twentieth century was woefully
replete with examples of similarly extreme subjugations of re-
ligious minorities in other parts of the world, none is fairly
compared to the peculiar institution.  Nevertheless, the design
of an antidiscrimination norm in respect to religion raises
questions akin to those that arise in the design of a racial
equality norm.
II
THE DIVERSITY OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENTS
‘Discriminatory intent’ is not a unitary concept.  It is pro-
tean and plural.  By looking at the species of intent the Court
has recognized, the kinds that it has rejected, and the forms
that simmer away at the periphery of its vision, it is possible to
snap into focus the unavoidable diversity of discriminatory in-
tent as a concept.
Such diversity is not intrinsically a problem: many impor-
tant terms in constitutional law have multiple meanings.  But
the Court has failed to explicitly recognize that impermissible
intent can take one of several forms.  As a result, it has failed to
grapple with the imperative of maintaining a diversity of evi-
dentiary approaches.  Its selectivity over evidentiary methods—
which is unjustifiable as an effort to match evidentiary tools to
the various forms of observed discriminatory intents—gener-
ates highly problematic outcomes.132  It is an implicit tax-and-
subsidy regime favoring some groups over others.
This Part steps back from the doctrine and provides a gen-
eral taxonomy of ‘discriminatory intent’ by drawing on econom-
ics, political science, and psychological literature—all bodies of
scholarship that provide more precise and tractable definitions
of discrimination than constitutional law.  I argue here that the
term ‘discriminatory intent’ encompasses a wide range of possi-
ble operational understandings.  I trace five potential under-
standings of ‘discriminatory intent’ by tacking back and forth
between doctrine and extrinsic social science evidence.  Beyond
demonstrating the plasticity of discriminatory intent as a con-
cept, an important dividend from my analysis is that even doc-
trinal formulations that are generally thought to work
independent of intent (e.g., the anticlassification approach in
Equal Protection) turn out, on closer inspection, to be best
132 See infra subpart IV.A.
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understood as focused on the quality and content of officials’
cognitive processes.
A second analytic payoff is that each conception of discrim-
inatory intent has fuzzy boundaries.  It is far from clear which
cases fall within each category.  When the Court draws distinc-
tions about what is within and what is beyond the constitu-
tional pale, the reasons for these divisions can be opaque or
inconsistent.
Before turning to these variations, however, it is worth ex-
plaining why one well-respected theory of discriminatory intent
does not appear in the taxonomy.  In an influential 1989 arti-
cle, David Strauss offered a “definition” of discriminatory intent
that turned on the analytic device of “reversing the groups,”
and asking whether the same decision would have been made
had the adverse effects of government action fallen on the ma-
jority rather than the minority.133  The counterfactual “revers-
ing the groups” test seems to avoid direct inquiry into mental
states, and instead, calls for a judicial reconstruction of what
government actors would have done but for the suspect classi-
fication at issue.  However, as Strauss observed (in an effort to
demolish the coherence of a discriminatory intent standard),
his proposed counterfactual inquiry still requires a designation
of which features of the background world—including not just
the identity of the parties but also “differences in the size of the
two groups and in their economic and social status, as well as
the[ir] history of relations”—would change, and which would be
held constant, in the hypothetical.134  He thought this an infea-
sible inquiry.
But assume that the counterfactual is narrowly defined to
focus on a change to the identity of the affected party.135  This
would require a judge to decide whether the official had in fact
been moved by some kind of race-specific reason.  They would
therefore have to decide not only which sorts of race-specific
reasons count for constitutional purposes, but also would have
to estimate their causal effect on the relevant official decision
133 Strauss, Discriminatory Intent, supra note 70, at 956–57.  The same test
was proposed earlier by Eric Schnapper, Two Categories of Discriminatory Intent,
17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 51 (1982).
134 Strauss, Discriminatory Intent, supra note 70, at 971.
135 Audit studies employing testers in retail and housing contexts employ this
assumption. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimina-
tion in Bargaining for a New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304, 305 (1995) (finding race
and gender effects by audit studies). But see James J. Heckman, Detecting Dis-
crimination, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 101, 102 (1998) (noting “fragility” of findings from
audit studies given “alternative assumptions about unobservable variables and
the way labor markets work”).
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being challenged.  Reversing the groups—at least when pre-
cisely applied to the transaction at stake—hence simply re-
quires the judge to ask if an improper intent is at work.  What
‘counts’ as an improper intent remains to be determined.136
The “reversing the groups” lens, at least in its simplest and
most tractable form, is best viewed as an analytic frame for,
rather than as a resolution of, the difficult question of how to
define discriminatory intent.
A. Animus as Discriminatory Intent: Taste-Based
Discrimination
The simplest and perhaps most intuitive form of “discrimi-
natory intent” is the “disutility caused by contact with some
individuals.”137  In a very influential body of work, the econo-
mist Gary Becker has termed this “taste-based discrimination”
and deployed it as a conceptual device to model labor market
dynamics with discriminatory employers or coworkers.138
Becker’s model of taste-based discrimination focuses on the
market equilibrium that would result from employers averse to
contact with minority employees and thus willing to pay a pre-
mium to employ (equally skilled) non-minority employees.  The
dynamic effect of this premium is to create a competitive ad-
vantage for non-discriminating firms.  The theory hence
predicts that “[a]s long as there is a single nondiscriminatory
employer, all discriminators will be driven out of the mar-
ket.”139  Of course, the absence of market dynamics, and its
136 Strauss asserts that this captures both conscious and unconscious intent,
but it could also capture instances in which officials make different decisions
because changing ascriptive identity changes the social welfare effects of a deci-
sion. See Strauss, Discriminatory Intent, supra note 70, at 960.  But it is not clear
how he would treat cases in which race serves as a proxy for a valid character
trait, such as criminality or partisan identity.  This problem parallels the principal
barrier to causal identification in many econometric studies. See Kerwin Kofi
Charles & Jonathan Guryan, Studying Discrimination: Fundamental Challenges
and Recent Progress, 3 ANN. REV. ECON. 479, 480–81 (2011) (“The main problem
this line of inquiry confronts is that, in observational data, individuals of different
races may systematically differ with respect to other determinants of labor market
outcomes apart from race, including some that are unobserved.”).
137 GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 15 (2d ed. 1971).
138 Id. at 14 (modeling taste-based discrimination as a “discrimination coeffi-
cient,” which “acts as a bridge between money and net costs.  Suppose an em-
ployer were faced with the money wage rate p of a particular factor; he is assumed
to act as if p(1 + di were the net wage rate, with di as his [discrimination coefficient]
against this factor.”).  For a similar treatment of discrimination, see Harold Dem-
setz, Minorities in the Market Place, 43 N.C. L. REV. 271, 271 (1965), who viewed
“discrimination against” as an “aversion to association” with certain groups.
139 John J. Donohue III, Is Title VII Efficient?, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411, 1422
(1986).
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substitution by democratic pressures, means that there is no
similar sorting effect at work in government.140
Taste-based discrimination can be roughly translated into
the lexicon of constitutional doctrine as “animus.”  A measure
may hence be invalid because its adoption was “born of ani-
mosity toward the class of persons affected.”141  For example,
in striking down Section 2 of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), the Court in United States v. Windsor focused on
whether that provision had the “purpose and effect of disproval
of a class.”142  A prohibition on animal sacrifices enacted by the
residents of the Florida city of Hialeah out of “hostility” toward
the Santeria faith similarly rested on constitutionally-infirm
ground.143  Alternatively, animus may enter into the constitu-
tional analysis, not because the decision-maker is biased, but
rather because it acts to the detriment of a person because of
the animus of third parties.  For example, a state–court judge
cannot deny custody to a parent solely on the ground that her
new spouse is African-American, such that the child will be
subject to less favorable social treatment once within her
care.144
Windsor, which concerned DOMA’s denial of federal recog-
nition to same-sex marriages, illustrates an important distinc-
tion between Becker’s concept of taste-based discrimination
and the “animus” version of discriminatory intent in the consti-
tutional context.145  There are instances in which animus has
taken a laboring oar, the effect of the challenged measure has
been to create physical separation from the protected class as
140 Deborah Hellman offers a different definition of animus focused on the
intent to harm. See Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimination, 102 VA. L.
REV. 895, 903 (2016) (“One way to fail to treat someone as an equal is to intend to
harm him—to adopt a policy that burdens him not merely in spite of this burden
but deliberately because of it.”).  I employ Becker’s definition because he attends
to both the intent to harm and the intent to avoid or to deny benefits out of
aversive sentiments.
141 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
142 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2681 (2013).
143 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 541 (1993).
144 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (“Private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them
effect.”).  I have characterized Palmore as concerned with taste-based discrimina-
tion, but it can also be ranked as a case about statistical discrimination, see infra
subpart II.B, in the sense that the custody decision was based on an estimate of
the expected welfare of the child under different familial arrangements.  The race
of the parent, in this view, operated as a proxy for welfare.
145 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (“[G[ranting certiorari on the question of
the constitutionality of § 3 of DOMA;” a federal law that made same-sex marriage
illegal).
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Becker predicted.146  But in Windsor, the central tendency of
the challenged measure was not, as Becker theorized, to dis-
courage contact with the maligned group.  To be sure, DOMA’s
effect may well have been to suppress the public expression of
gay unions, and thus diminish the visibility of gay people.  But
DOMA’s main intended effect was not to promote physical sep-
aration from gays and lesbians.  It was rather to delegitimize
same-sex unions (and thus to disparage their participants).
Windsor also points toward an ambiguity in the definition
of animus.  The idea of taste-based discrimination connotes an
almost physical repugnance toward the disapproved group.  As
Martha Nussbaum has underscored, “disgust” of this form is
plausibly understood to propel what the Court calls animus.147
At the same time, it seems reasonable to think that the federal
law challenged in Windsor was also animated by a sense of
moral disapproval that is not well captured by the concept of
taste-based discrimination.  Indeed, in endorsing the right to
same-sex marriage two years after Windsor, the Court “empha-
sized that religions, and those who adhere to religious doc-
trines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere
conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should
not be condoned.”148  Since the Court’s decision finding a right
to same-sex marriage did not rest on a finding of animus, it had
no cause to ask whether a sincerely-held moral theory can
itself revolve around some kind of contempt for, or a demand
for the subordination of, a protected class, such that it is a
form of animus.  That question about the perimeter of the “ani-
146 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446–47 (1985).
147 See Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 667, 683
(2010) (“The idea that same-sex unions will sully traditional marriage therefore
cannot be understood without moving to the terrain of disgust and contamina-
tion.”). See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2010) (describing the Court’s conception of
animus).
148 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).  For a moral argument
that seems to fall within this category, see J.M. Finnis, Legal Enforcement of
“Duties to Oneself”: Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437 (1987)
(arguing that anti-gay legislation “may manifest, not contempt, but rather a sense
of the equal worth and human dignity of those people whose conduct is outlawed
precisely on the ground that it expresses a serious misconception of, and actually
degrades, human worth and dignity, and thus degrades their own personal worth
and dignity, along with that of others who may be induced to share or emulate
their degradation”).  It seems worth asking here whether Finnis’s position is em-
pirically plausible as a description of widely held views about gays. Cf. Andrew
Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89,
116–17 (1997) (concluding that it is not).
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mus” form of discriminatory intent, like others, remains
unexplored.149
B. Impermissible Criteria as Proxies for Licit Ends: The
Problem of Statistical Discrimination (with
Attention to the Double-Effect Doctrine)
The second leading theory of discrimination focuses on the
informational role played by salient characteristics such as
gender or membership in a racial or religious ascriptive
group.150  Economists dissatisfied with Becker’s theory of
taste-based preferences observed that such characteristics
might be valuable if they operated as proxies for other less
observable characteristics.  For example, an employer might
believe that African-Americans are less productive than Cauca-
sian workers.  As a result, she might employ race as a proxy for
productivity.  On this view, employers use race as a proxy for
otherwise unobservable characteristics such as investments
that workers make in terms of habits of action and thought,
steadiness, punctuality, responsiveness, and initiative.151
Studies of labor markets confirm that observed racial differen-
tial in wages is due in part to such “statistical
discrimination.”152
A central difference between taste-based discrimination
and statistical discrimination is that the first concerns a state
149 Perhaps the closest decision on point is Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
which upheld the Internal Revenue Service’s decision to deny a religious college
tax-exempt status because of its racially discriminatory policies. See 461 U.S.
574, 581 (1983) (describing discriminatory policies).  This suggests that animus
embedded in the rhetorical and ideological matrix of a legible faith system re-
mains nonetheless animus.  For a consideration of the same question in the form
of an inquiry into the meaning of the term “bias” in the psychological literature,
see Christian S. Crandall & Amy Eshleman, A Justification-Suppression Model of
the Expression and Experience of Prejudice, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 414, 417 (2003).
150 The leading papers are Edmund S. Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism
and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659, 659 (1972), and Kenneth J. Arrow, What Has
Economics to Say About Racial Discrimination?, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 96 (1998).
151 See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN
LABOR MARKETS 3, 24–27 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973) [hereinafter
Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination] (“Skin color and sex are cheap sources of
information.  Therefore prejudices (in the literal sense of pre-judgments, judg-
ments made in advance of the evidence) about such differentia can be easily
implemented False.”).
152 For powerful evidence from innovative experimental studies, see John A.
List, The Nature and Extent of Discrimination in the Marketplace: Evidence from the
Field, 119 Q.J. ECON. 49, 49–50 (2004).  Other studies have identified evidence of
taste-based discrimination by leveraging differences in black-white racial prefer-
ences between states. See Kerwin Kofi Charles & Jonathan Guryan, Prejudice and
Wages: An Empirical Assessment of Becker’s The Economics of Discrimination,
116 J. POL. ECON. 773, 773–74 (2008).
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of desire while the second concerns a state of belief.153  A taste-
based discriminator has a preference in respect to future states
of affairs, and hence acts with an intention or a purpose to
make those come about.  A statistical discriminator has a belief
about the world, whether certain or probabilistic, that provides
a basis for action toward an end that itself has no impermissi-
ble content.  There is then a logical distinction between the two
forms of discrimination.
At the same time, these two categories are not absolutely
distinct from one another in practice.  Consider, for example,
the idea of a stereotype, a generally pejorative term used to
condemn certain generalizations, and in particular generaliza-
tions with a negative character.154  Some stereotypes may be
based on spurious correlations, or reflect the outcomes of third
parties’ prejudice (e.g., a belief that a certain racial minority is
lazy may be premised on comparatively higher unemployment
rates that in turn are predicated on animus).  Others may be
based on sound empirical foundations.  And there is an inter-
mediate category in which the generalization is based on a
morally flawed reading of available data.  Taste-based and sta-
tistical discrimination, in short, are not acoustically separate
from each other in practice.
It is not immediately obvious why the Constitution should
be concerned with the epistemic use of an impermissible
ground at all, provided the government’s ends are legitimate
and its beliefs are untainted by animus.  The case law contains
only fragments of an answer.  One theory might be that it is
difficult or impossible to distinguish between taste-based dis-
crimination and statistical discrimination, so that the latter
must be prohibited along with the former.  In Justice
O’Connor’s words, we might conclude that taste-based dis-
crimination is “potentially so harmful to the entire body poli-
tic,” whereas “racial characteristics so seldom provide a
relevant basis for disparate treatment,” that the two must be
treated alike.155  Her claim here may be that statistical discrim-
ination is so seldom effective, while taste-based discrimination
is so easily hidden, that a broad prophylactic rule is required.
153 See Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV. 463,
476 (1992) (drawing this distinction).
154 See FREDRICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES & STEREOTYPES 3–4 (2003).
As Schauer observes, “judgment without generalization is impossible,” such that
it cannot be that all generalizations used as heuristics are impermissible. Id. at
214–15.
155 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-5\CRN503.txt unknown Seq: 37 30-AUG-18 12:31
2018] WHAT IS DISCRIMINATORY INTENT? 1247
Neither the Court nor commentators, however, have ever
substantiated either element of Justice O’Connor’s logic.  Nor is
either element obviously true.  The fact that race (for example)
seems to provide information for employers,156 suggests that it
may be epistemically useful in other policy contexts—for exam-
ple, the provision of protection against private animus.  At the
same time, it is far from clear that we cannot distinguish statis-
tical discrimination and taste-based discrimination in practice.
Alternatively, a constitutional prohibition on statistical dis-
crimination might be justified by analogy to the dynamic effects
of statistical discrimination on human capital acquisition for
labor markets.  As Glenn Loury has pointed out, the existence
of statistical discrimination entails that the purportedly
subordinate class (e.g., African-Americans in the labor market)
can expect to receive lower returns on investments in educa-
tion.157  A dynamic effect of statistical discrimination by race in
current labor markets, Loury observed, is to disincentivize the
acquisition of human capital by African-Americans.158  The
generalizations upon which statistical discrimination are pred-
icated, even if false at their inception, become self-confirming
over time.  The question is then whether a similar dynamic
arises in the constitutional context when official distinctions,
inaccurate in their inception, provoke behaviors that in turn
render the distinctions increasingly sticky over time.  For ex-
ample, if police falsely believe that a certain race is more vio-
lent, they may treat members of that race with greater
harshness and force as a prophylactic; in time, this treatment
will induce the very violence that was feared and used as
justification.
It is not at all clear that doctrines under the First and the
Fourteenth Amendment, however, evince any consciousness of
the possibility of such dynamic effects of law.  As a result, the
justification for including discrimination as proxy within the
constitutional prohibition (as opposed to simply outside the do-
main of decent, sensible policy) remains to be stated.
156 See List, supra note 152, at 49–50.
157 See GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 87–88 (2002).
158 See id. at 179–84; see also Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, supra note
151, at 24–27 (noting the possibility of such adaptive human capital invest-
ments); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1626 (1991)
[hereinafter Strauss, Racial Discrimination in Employment] (“Statistical discrimi-
nation can lead to inefficiently low investment in human capital among members
of the group that is discriminated against.”).
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Perhaps fittingly, doctrinal treatment of statistical discrim-
ination—wherein the relevant trait is deployed as a proxy for
some otherwise licit end—has a hesitant and equivocal quality.
The border between permissible and prohibited states of mind
here seems to slice between cases that are more alike than
different.159  On the one hand, where race is used as a proxy for
partisanship in the redistricting context, the Constitution is
squarely implicated.160  Similarly, when race is deployed as a
proxy for risk when managing a carceral population, that deci-
sion also elicits strict scrutiny.161  Further, when gender is
used as a proxy for a trait, based on some stereotype about
men and women, the relevant law receives heightened scru-
tiny.162  On the other hand, when race is employed as a trait in
police suspect descriptions, federal courts have not expended
significant effort in considering their constitutionality.163  Inso-
far as contact with the police is the modal form of interaction
between the state and certain racial minorities (or, at least,
men within that minority group) in urban contexts,164 this la-
cuna is a significant one.
Not only is the justification for a constitutional prohibition
on statistical discrimination unclear, its current borders are
also theoretically problematic.  Consider two cases: In the first,
the normatively salient trait is used as a proxy for a licit end.  In
the second, an official takes a decision aiming at a wholly licit
end by relying on a lawful classification but does so with the
knowledge that the adverse effects of that decision will fall
159 The border between taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimina-
tion is also less crisp than generally believed.  A generalization deployed for the
purpose of statistical discrimination might itself be a function of animus against a
given group, or otherwise go awry in a number of different ways. Cf. Cass R.
Sunstein, Why Markets Don’t Stop Discrimination, 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 21, 26
(1991) (noting a variety of forms of irrational prejudices, including “(a) a belief that
members of a group have certain characteristics when in fact they do not, (b) a
belief that many or most members of a group have certain characteristics when in
fact only a few do, and (c) reliance on fairly accurate group-based generalizations
when more accurate classifying devices are available”).  Some of these generaliza-
tions, however accurate, might also reflect taste-based discrimination.
160 See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 n.1 (2017) (“A plaintiff suc-
ceeds at [the first stage of the analysis] even if the evidence reveals that a legisla-
ture elevated race to the predominant criterion in order to advance other goals,
including political ones.”); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 914 (1995) (“[T]he
precise use of race as a proxy” for “political interest[s]” is prohibited).
161 See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
162 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
163 See R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal
Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1077–78 (2001).
164 See Tracey L. Meares, Programming Errors: Understanding the Constitution-
ality of Stop-and-Frisk as a Program, Not an Incident, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 159,
162–63 (2015).
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largely upon a protected class.  What makes the latter case
interesting is the contingent background fact of a high correla-
tion between the lawful classification selected and the imper-
missible classification.  For example, take the decision to
reward military veterans with employment-related preferences,
or the decision to intensify coercive street policing in urban
neighborhoods with high levels of street-centered narcotics
transactions.  These are both cases in which a reasonable deci-
sion maker cannot but be aware that their decision is predi-
cated on a criterion that is functionally indistinguishable
from—and, indeed, perhaps from the outside observationally
equivalent to—a decision based on the impermissible criterion.
In one case, it is gender, in another race.165  What then is the
difference between taking aim directly at a protected class, and
taking aim at a classification that substantially and predictably
overlaps with that class?
In the ‘type two’ cases described above, the Court has
found no constitutional infirmity.166  This nonliability rule, first
announced in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, a case involv-
ing the gendered effects of veterans’ employment-related bene-
fits,167 tracks the Thomist doctrine of double effect.  That
argument in turn was reintroduced to modern philosophy by
Philippa Foot.  It holds, in rough paraphrase, that an “oblique”
intention in respect to an impermissible goal is not usually
fatal to the morality of an action aimed at an otherwise proper
end.168
But should all cases of double-effect really be ranked as
outside the domain of constitutional concern?  Setting aside
the difficult proof problems that might arise in determining
what criterion a decision-making official in fact employed, the
question is a more different one than judges or commentators
seemingly realize.
There are numerous significant commonalities, as well as
some differences, between the Feeney scenario and plainly im-
165 This problem is distinct from the cases in which statistical discrimination
and animus turn out to be observationally equivalent. See Jody D. Armour, Race
Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Ne-
grophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 791 (1994).
166 See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (proof of discrim-
inatory purpose requires showing that the government decision-maker “selected
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely
‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group”).
167 See id. at 259.
168 See Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double
Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES AND OTHER ESSAYS IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 19, 25 (1978)
(distinguishing between “direct” and “oblique” intentions).
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permissible uses of statistical discrimination.  For one thing,
neither involves a goal that itself has an impermissible charac-
ter (e.g., when people are targeted for police coercion on the
basis of an a priori belief that criminality is concentrated within
certain racial minorities).  In both cases, the official is likely
aware that the impermissible criterion (race, ethnicity, or relig-
ion) is entangled, directly or obliquely, with the means elected
to accomplish the licit goal.  What divides the cases is the pres-
ence of a very specific and finely drawn form of intentionality:
in one case, the official consciously deploys that criterion,
whereas in the other case, the official knowingly ignores the
role of the normatively fraught classification as a marker of
practical social difference in the world.  The intent to use (say)
race as a proxy is constitutionally distinct from the decision to
use a functional substitute for race.  But the moral quality and
consequences of those decisions track each other more closely
than the doctrine suggests.169
Let’s accept the salience of the double-effect doctrine as a
matter of constitutional law. Still, it seems worth noticing that
in both legal and philosophical treatments of specific double-
effect cases, there is no hard-and-fast boundary between direct
and oblique intentions.  What is clear in theory, in other words,
is murkier in real life.  Philosophers do not morally excuse the
terrorist, for example, on the ground that he intended only
political change, whereas the deaths he caused were merely
obliquely intended.170  Nor should they.
Even if full information is available, the distinction between
direct and oblique intention must be drawn on the basis of
objective construals of intents, not the “idiosyncrasies of partic-
ular individuals and their willful or perverse constructions of
the purposes of their actions.”171  This principle is akin to (al-
though not precisely the same as) the familiar axiom of the law
that people are understood to intend the natural and foresee-
able consequences of their actions.172  If individuals’ subjective
169 Both Washington v. Davis and Emp’t Div. v. Smith pointed to the practical
consequences of an effects rule as a reason to limit liability to cases of intentional
discrimination. Feeney makes no such appeal to practicality although the case
can readily be understood in the same terms.
170 G.E.M. Anscombe, War and Murder, reprinted in MORAL PROBLEMS: A COL-
LECTION OF PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 280–81 (James Rachels ed., 1971).
171 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death, and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1135, 1155 (2003).
172 See, e.g., GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 286
(1958) (“There is no legal difference between desiring or intending a consequence
as following from your conduct, and persisting in your conduct with a knowledge
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accounts of their own purposes controls, intent doctrine would
rarely rule an action out of constitutional bounds.
But if the boundary between direct and oblique intention is
necessarily drawn on the basis of an objective construal of
intent, then the double-effect scenarios covered by Feeney nec-
essarily raise the question of when an otherwise licit criterion is
so closely and predictably correlated with a normatively prob-
lematic criterion that the same constitutional concerns are
triggered.173  To my knowledge, courts have not engaged in this
inquiry.  They simply have not recognized the need for objective
construals of intentionality in the way that philosophers have.
To the extent the double-effect doctrine itself provides a
basis for the rule, moreover, a powerful challenge by T.M.
Scanlon holds that what matters in such cases is not the qual-
ity of the actor’s intentions, but rather the availability of objec-
tive justifications for the specific action.174  As I understand it,
Scanlon’s framing would not necessarily treat the veterans’
benefits case differently from the use of race as a proxy for
carceral risk (although, depending on the specific justificatory
facts available, it may or may not yield a different distribution
of outcomes).  But the point here is that both cases would be
analyzed under a parallel rubric and would stand or fall on the
same grounds.
C. Anticlassification: Race and Religious Classifications as
Discriminatory Intent
Some bases for government decisions inflict such grave
dignitary and stigmatic harm by dint of their history or because
of present circumstances that their deployment can never be
justified by balancing the costs and benefits.175  This logic sup-
that the consequence will inevitably follow from it, though not desiring that
consequence.”).
173 Feeney recognized this problem but provided a non sequitur by way of
answer.  According to Justice O’Connor, the inevitability of a discriminatory effect
can lead to a “strong inference” of discriminatory intent—unless “the impact is
essentially an unavoidable consequence of a legislative policy that has in itself
always been deemed to be legitimate.”  Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
n.25 (1979).  But then the legislature has chosen, among many policy ends, one
that imposes “unavoidable” and symmetrical costs to a protected group—which
itself might be constitutionally problematic.  The Feeney Court simply assumes
that it is not.
174 T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS 1–37 (2008); see also Fallon, supra note
48, at 564–65 (discussing Scanlon’s approach).  I am grateful to Andrew Verstein R
for discussion of this point.
175 There might also be a deontic justification for an anticlassification rule.
That is, it is always per se wrong for an official to take account of a suspect
classification in their reasoning.  This argument would require, of course, some
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ports an “anticlassificatory” approach to Equal Protection or
the Religion Clause.  This approach has been understood to
focus on the formal content of the formal enunciations (i.e., a
statute, regulation, or directive) issued by official actors of the
formal criterion used in an orally-delivered order.  But I shall
argue that it sweeps more broadly.
Most notably, the Court has deployed some version of an
anticlassificatory lens in present Equal Protection law in re-
spect to race.  That clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
summarized as a means of “protecting individuals from the
harm of categorization by race.”176  But it has taken a different
path, in contrast, in its treatment of gender under the Equal
Protection Clause by dint of its focus on false and degrading
stereotypes—a concern that reflects a distinct concern with
misguided statistical discrimination.177  In the Religion Clause
context, the Justices have also taken a mixed path in which an
anticlassification logic plays a part, but does not explain all the
cases.  Hence, Douglas Laycock has identified “formal neutral-
ity,” or “the mere absence of religious classifications,” as one
element of Religion Clause doctrine.178  Formal neutrality en-
tails that financial aid be distributed in terms that make no
distinction between religious and nonreligious entities and
would prohibit regulatory exceptions exclusively drawn for re-
ligious actors.179  Both of these positions are found in current
jurisprudence.180  There are, however, many other areas of Re-
explanation of why suspect classifications are wrong regardless of consequence.
See infra text accompanying note 190 (discussing one possibility). R
176 Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1287 (2011)
[hereinafter Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization].
177 See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010) (noting the dominance of stereo-
types in this jurisprudence and tracing its etiology).
178 Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
313, 320 (1996); accord Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated
Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 999–1001 (1990).  For a de-
fense of formal neutrality in the Establishment Clause context, see Philip B.
Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1961).
179 See Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, supra note 178, at 1001. R
180 See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct.
2012, 2024 (2017) (nondiscriminatory funding); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1989) (religion-based regulatory exceptions). But cf. Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 338–39 (1987) (finding an exception to Title VII for religious groups).
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ligion Clause jurisprudence that formal neutrality does not
explain.181
An anticlassification rule seems at first blush to fall
outside the domain of discriminatory intent.  That rule, viewed
superficially, simply demands that judges examine the formal
content of the rule of decision deployed by a government actor.
But this exclusion is too quick for a number of reasons.  As an
initial matter, anticlassification rules must bite on the cognitive
content of government decision-makers’ behavior, in addition
to the formal context of laws and regulations, to have any prac-
tical effect in our system of constitutional adjudication.  That
is, an anticlassification approach might be understood as a
directive that officials never deploy, in their own thinking, the
relevant prohibited ground as a criterion for decision, whether
openly or otherwise.
This formulation focuses on the content of the rules sub-
jectively applied by the official and asks whether the cognitive
process deployed to reach a decision, whether articulated or
not, turned at any point on an impermissible classification.  In
this sense, it is directly concerned with reasons an official in
fact has for acting (i.e., their intentions) and not the formal
content of the law.  Consistent with this, it would seem that in
most cases, a government classification is not subject to chal-
lenge unless it is actually applied by an official to a litigant: The
mere fact of its existence is (rarely) enough.182
Moreover, the most forcefully tendered alternative justifica-
tion for an anticlassification rule, which is framed in terms of
its effects on citizens, rather than officials’ intentions, turns
out to be implausible on even superficial inspection.  Speaking
of the Equal Protection Clause, Justice Thomas has argued
that “[t]he Constitution abhors classifications based on race
not only because those classifications can harm favored races
or are based on illegitimate motives, but also because every
time the government places citizens on racial registers and
makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or benefits, it
181 See, e.g., Hosana-Tabor Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct.
694, 709 (2012) (creating a regulatory exception for some religious entities).
182 For example, in racial gerrymandering cases, voters who live outside the
allegedly gerrymandered district generally lack Article III standing. See Ala. Legis-
lative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2015) (citing United
States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 744–45 (1995)).  Establishment Clause cases are a
limited exception to this general rule. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677
(2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion).
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demeans us all.”183  (As an aside, note that although this is
victim-focused language, the italicized language is couched in
terms of officials’ intentions—and not on the semantic quality
of the relevant law or regulation—even as the final clause is
focused on the experience of those subjected to classifications).
Yet taken as a literal account of subjective experiences of
those subject to impermissible classifications, Justice
Thomas’s argument is not true.  It is plain that members of the
polity have widely divergent responses to different government
acts even when they do not implicate a suspect classifica-
tion.184  Not all members of the polity feel demeaned when a
racial, ethnic, or religious classification is deployed.  Some, to
the contrary, feel immense pride.  Indeed, it is not even clear
that all those disadvantaged by the use of such a criterion
should feel slighted (as in the use of affirmative action, for
example, where other psychological reactions are both plausi-
ble and likely).185  As Lourey notes, “the simple fact that a
person classifies others (or herself, for that matter) in terms of
‘race’ is in itself neither a good nor a bad thing.”186  Where it is
a source of identification, belonging, and self-respect, such la-
bels have a range of use beyond disparagement.
The appeal of anticlassification thus cannot hinge on the
subjective and perhaps idiosyncratic experiences of those who
perceive the government acting and thereby form judgments of
their political standing.  Indeed, it is striking that many policies
that are challenged under an anticlassification rule do not use
the prohibited criterion in a highly salient and public fashion.
Paradoxically, that criterion is salient only because of litigation
challenging it.187  There is something troublingly circular about
183 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).  For a collection and critique of the
seminal opinions in the race context, see Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitu-
tion is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3–7 (1991).
184 Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
943, 954–58 (1995) (recognizing that government actions may have different
meanings for various observers and that government); Adam M. Samaha, Regula-
tion for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1584 (2012) (noting that
“observers might perceive an appearance differently, disagree over whether and
how it should be assigned meaning, or value the same meaning differently”).
185 See Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1, 17 (2000) (“Affirmative action expresses inclusion, not exclusion.
While individual white applicants who would be admitted under a race-blind
system are in fact excluded (in other words, they do suffer concrete harm), the
best understanding of the practice in our culture today is not that white students
are not welcome or worthy of admission . . . .”).
186 LOURY, supra note 157, at 19.
187 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206 (2016) (describing
the manner in which the University of Texas took account of race as one of many
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building the constitutional case for anticlassification on public
perceptions, which themselves are functions of constitutional
litigation.
If subjective perceptions of legitimacy and worth are in
practice variously affected by suspect classifications, it is hard
to see why a categorical rule against them could be warranted.
The Court would have to make an empirical weighing of the
positive and negative reactions elicited by a government policy.
Hence, when the Court in 2005 said that “[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on
the basis of race,” it has to be understood as making not just a
normative but also an empirical claim.188  Yet the relevant deci-
sion contained no empirical evidence and no weighing of the
costs of demoralization against the benefits of recognition.189
So the disparagement-centered explanation of the anticlassifi-
cation rule is hard to sustain given observed empirical facts.
But on that score, the jurisprudence is characterized by
silence.
Accordingly, the logic of anticlassification must reflect a
victim-independent judgment that there are normative
grounds for objecting to the use of a specific criterion in official
decision-making.  These grounds cannot turn on the actual
subjective experiences of those who perceive the government
action.
The anticlassification concern, in this light, is better un-
derstood as being triggered by the occurrence of an impermissi-
ble criterion in the government’s decisional process, whether
overt or not.  It focuses on the cognitive content of governmen-
tal deliberation.  In other words, it is as much a matter of
“discriminatory intent” as taste-based discrimination and sta-
tistical discrimination.
Framed in these terms, the anticlassification rule might be
better supported by the argument that impermissible classifi-
cations embody or elicit objectionable forms of official inten-
“special circumstances” that themselves were only one of three prongs for deliber-
ation—albeit not in a high-salience way).
188 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
748 (2007).
189 While the decision discussed the costs of racial classification, the benefits
of recognition are not included in the analysis. See id. at 745 (“If the need for the
racial classifications embraced by the school districts is unclear, even on the
districts’ own terms, the costs are undeniable.”).  Justice Thomas, in his concur-
rence, noted that some scholars believe that racial classifications result in educa-
tional benefits.  Justice Thomas, however, found that the empirical evidence is
inconclusive. See id. at 761 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In reality, it is far from
apparent that coerced racial mixing has any educational benefits.”).
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tionality.  Consistent with this intuition, some Justices have
offered analogies to Nazi race laws when discussing racial clas-
sifications.190  These usually emotive comparisons suggest that
the Justices perceive some intrinsic, acontextual wrong in such
classifications that goes beyond the mere subjective percep-
tions of those regulated by the law.  Ascertaining whether this
intuition is plausible is beyond my remit here, but it cannot go
without comment that equating a racial gerrymander designed
to create majority-minority districts in North Carolina to the
1935 Nuremberg race laws is hardly self-evident—except, per-
haps, as evidence of a want of judgment on the speaker’s part.
Just as the boundaries of taste-based and statistical dis-
crimination are fuzzy, so too the plausible domain of the an-
ticlassification rule is not as clear as might first appear.  Again,
it is useful to consider the use of a formally permissible crite-
rion that is predictably likely to track the use of an impermissi-
ble criterion (e.g., a claim that is made about race in relation to
criminality).  If the use of the formally impermissible criterion is
so “demean[ing]”191 as to be beyond the constitutional pale,
then it seems at least worth asking whether a close proxy for
that impermissible classification would trigger some of the
same objections.  For example, when the Court allows the loos-
ening of Fourth Amendment protections in a “high crime area,”
it is possible to discern an arguably objectionable proxy for race
at work.192  It is hard to see why this term should not also be
condemned for the spillover stigmatic effect that results from
its implicit invocation of race—just as it is hard to see why
reasons for prohibiting the use of impermissible classifications
as a proxy for licit ends do not spill over and apply to double-
effect cases such as Feeney.193  In this way, the logic of an-
ticlassification is not easily confined as a matter of logic to
cases in which the impermissible criterion appears in the gov-
190 See, e.g., Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 633 n.1 (1990) (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) (referring to the “First Regulation to the Reichs Citizenship
Law of November 14, 1935” as well as the “Population Registration Act No. 30 of
1950, Statutes of the Republic of South Africa” (citations omitted)); cf. Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (stating that majority-minority voting districting
“bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid”).
191 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
192 See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (allowing searches based
on lower quantum of suspicion in a “high crime area”).  For some evidence that the
term “high crime area” is operationalized in racialized terms, see Jeff Fagan & Ben
Grunwald, Addicted to Wardlow (June 2017) (on file with author).
193 See supra text accompanying notes 166–73.
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ernment’s decisional process.  Experience, of course, is another
matter entirely.
D. The Intent to Promote One’s Status by Denigrating
Others: The Group-Status Production Theory of
Discrimination
Neither taste-based discrimination nor statistical discrimi-
nation explain the manifold ways in which impermissible crite-
rion are reflected in, and can motivate, the law.  In the
antebellum South, for example, races mixed physically be-
cause of the use of house slaves and because of white male
sexual predations against African-American women.194  Subse-
quently, neither laws barring miscegenation, nor criminal stat-
utes imposing higher penalties on interracial rather than
intraracial fornication, are readily explained by taste-based
discrimination.195  Indeed, to the extent that discrimination is
modeled as an aversion to contact with another group, one
might think that the law would need to use greater penalties
against intraracial fornication so as to engender effective
deterrence.
A third theory of discriminatory intent concerns state ac-
tion that is animated not by disgust or by epistemic deficiency,
but by the need to produce and reinforce status hierarchies
between different social groups.  As refined by Richard McAd-
ams, the theory of group-status production understands dis-
crimination as entailing “processes by which one . . . group
seeks to produce esteem for itself by lowering the status of
another group.”196  Esteem elicits more practical benefits such
as the “set of assumptions, privileges, and benefits that accom-
pany” membership in the high status group and that constitute
a valuable asset to be “affirmed, legitimated, and protected by
194 See EUGENE GENOVESE, ROLL JORDAN ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 328,
429 (1993).
195 For examples of such laws, see Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584 (1883),
which upheld a fornication statute that imposed greater penalties on interracial
acts. See also Peter Wallenstein, Interracial Marriage on Trial: Loving v. Virginia,
in RACE ON TRIAL: LAW AND JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 177 (Annette Gordon-Reed
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (reviewing history of miscegenation statutes in
American law).
196 Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1044 (1995);
see also George A. Akerlof, Discriminatory, Status-Based Wages Among Tradition-
Oriented, Stochastically Trading Coconut Producers, 93 J. POL. ECON. 265, 265–66
(1985) (offering a slightly distinct theory of discrimination focused on group
status).
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the law.”197  On McAdams’s account of racial preferences, an-
tidiscrimination law respecting racial identity is hence justified
because it “rais[es] the costs of subordination . . . [to] induce
people to switch to socially productive, or at least socially be-
nign, means of acquiring status.”198
The canon of First and Fourteenth Amendment law con-
tains traces of concern with group-status production.  In the
Equal Protection context, there are a number of decisions that
are hard to elucidate without it.  For example, in invalidating
Virginia’s miscegenation statute, the Court relied not only on
the fact that the law contained an explicit racial classification,
but also on the “fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial
marriages involving white persons[, which] demonstrates that
the racial classifications must stand on their own justification,
as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.”199  A
similar concern might be glimpsed in the Establishment Clause
jurisprudence of endorsement—a non-intent-based test—inso-
far as it is concerned with the creation of “preferred,” and by
implication disfavored, classes of citizens.200
Despite these hints, the theory of group-status production
remains at the periphery of constitutional antidiscrimination
law.  The rare instances in which the Court understands a
government action as part of a more general strategy of caste-
making are outliers.  A constitutional jurisprudence of status
production would require stable and reliable tools for picking
out measures intended to create hierarchical differences in sta-
tus.  As with dynamic accounts of statistical discrimination as
a motor of social differentiation, it is not clear that the group-
status production model is reconcilable with the narrowly
transactional focus of most constitutional doctrine.
Perhaps the most plausible doctrinal entailment of the
group-status production is what Reva Siegel calls the “an-
tibalkanization” theory of Equal Protection, which “assesses
the constitutionality of government action by asking about the
kind of polity it creates.”201  In particular, Siegel’s reconstruc-
197 Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1713
(1993); see also DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING
OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS (1991).
198 McAdams, supra note 196, at 1078.
199 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); accord Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 600 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (distinguishing Virginia’s anti-misce-
genation statute from sodomy prohibitions on the basis that the latter had a
“racially discriminatory purpose”).
200 See Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) (citation omitted).
201 Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization, supra note 176, at 1301.
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tion of an antibalkanization theme, largely drawing on recent
opinions by Justice Kennedy, draws attention to the possibility
that remedies for racial injustice will themselves exacerbate
intergroup resentment, and thereby entrench corrosive divi-
sions within society.202  In this fashion, it is conscious of com-
petition for status between social groups, although it is focused
on political consequences rather than discriminatory intent,
and hence does not fit into my typology here.
It is nevertheless worth noting that antibalkization may
well be somewhat fragile as a model for judicial intervention.
As Siegel notes, the logic of antibalkanization can lead judges
to curtail the state’s ability to remedy pervasive socioeconomic
disparities.203  In practice, this might leave society fractured
and unsettled. This would be an ironic consequence in the
Equal Protection Clause context, since the latter was crafted in
response to deficient state protection against private discrimi-
nation.204  Another problem is that judges are unlike econo-
mists working with Loury’s nuanced model of underinvestment
in human capital.  They have no data, and only bare intuitions
about when and how state action exacerbates racial
fragmentation.
Given that the Justices tend to give only cursory and apho-
ristic recognition of this causal inference problem, it seems
quite unlikely that they will accurately predict which instances
of discrimination have pernicious, self-confirming effects in the
long term without expert aid and a humble attentiveness to
sociological evidence.
E. The Marginal Cases of Bad Intent: The Relation of
Unconscious Bias and Structural Discrimination to
Discriminatory Intent
The two final, and most marginal, theories of discrimina-
tory intent concern unconscious bias and the neglect of struc-
tural forms of discrimination.  To be very clear, I do not think
that either of these is a core case of impermissible discrimina-
tory intent.  My reason for including them here is a bit more
subtle: Both, in my view, are conceptually and practically con-
202 See id. at 1302–03 (arguing that antibalkanization “vindicates constitu-
tional values by authorizing representative institutions to promote equality, while
imposing on courts responsibility for constraining the form of political interven-
tions so as to ameliorate resentments they may engender”).
203 See id. at 1359.
204 See CURRIE, supra note 63, at 349, 349 n.143; see also John Harrison,
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1436–51
(1992).
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gruent with core conceptions of discriminatory intent.  They are
the ambiguous limit cases of discriminatory intent in the sense
that both turn on the risk that government decision-makers
will take account of an impermissible ground of decision even
in the absence of an explicit instruction or desire to do so.
Hence, I lump them together here for convenience’s sake.
Consider first implicit bias.  A large body of psychological
studies suggests that, at least with respect to race, “[i]mplicit
biases[,] implicit attitudes and stereotypes . . . are both perva-
sive (most individuals show evidence of some biases), and large
in magnitude.”205  Studies of implicit bias extend to high-sali-
ence situations where the use of government authority is espe-
cially controversial.  For example, psychological studies of
police use of firearms using simulated targets of a different race
suggest that unarmed African-American targets are errone-
ously shot more often than unarmed white targets.  In contrast,
armed white targets are mistakenly spared more often than
armed African-American targets.206  Studies of sentencing de-
cisions find similar distortions.207
Implicit bias is, by definition, not conscious—and hence is
distinct from the other strands of discriminatory intent can-
vassed above—but it is a function of cognitive processes and
categories that determine intentional actions.208  This psycho-
logical quality means that it is not cleanly distinct from other
kinds of relevant intentionality.  Moreover, taste-based dis-
crimination that is costly to express openly may be rearticu-
lated as implicit appeals to the aversive stereotypes.  That is,
there may be a sublimation of the discriminatory intent that is
205 Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias
and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 473 (2010) (summarizing studies). But see F.
Oswald et al., Using the IAT to Predict Ethnic and Racial Discrimination: Small
Effect Sizes of Unknown Societal Significance, 108 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 562, 565–67 (2015) (casting doubt on external validity of studies).
206 Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Dis-
ambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1314, 1319 (2002).  Analysis of aggregate data concerning the use of police force
has generated some evidence of such bias in action. See, e.g., Correll et al., supra
note 22, at 207 (reporting findings from an empirical study, including a finding
that police officers were quicker to shoot armed African-Americans than they were
whites); Justin Nix et al., A Bird’s Eye View of Civilians Killed by Police in 2015, 16
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 319, 324–26 (2017) (providing evidence of implicit bias
in police killings of civilians).
207 See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stere-
otypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 383, 383–84 (2006).
208 See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1504–08
(2005).
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commonly taken as a conscious political strategy.209  To the
extent that implicit bias becomes a (sometimes conscious) sub-
stitute for overt taste-based discrimination in the political and
public sphere,210 there is an obvious case for considering its
regulation under the rubric of discriminatory intent.211
In contrast, structural discrimination concerns the “inter-
play between individuals and the[ir] larger organizational envi-
ronments in which they work.”212  In its most common
articulation, it is used to characterize the role of race in Ameri-
can society (although its terms are readily transposed to gen-
der, sexuality, or ethnicity).  Its principal theorists seek to
describe and critique a “racialized social system” in which “eco-
nomic, political, social, and ideological levels are partially
structured by the placement of actors in racial categories or
races.”213  Importantly, those theorists point out that it is not
easy to characterize social action within such a system as dis-
criminatory vel non: When the regulatory principles of social
status, and hence the governmental systems for allocating
benefits or burdens on the basis of status or desert—presup-
positions that in insolation would be quickly labeled discrimi-
natory—are so pervasively and subtly broadcasted through the
frames of social action, they cannot be avoided without con-
209 See TALI MENDELBERG, THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLICIT
MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF EQUALITY 3–27 (2001) (discussing reliance by elected
politicians and candidates upon implicit messages of racial subordination embed-
ded into racially neutral sounding language).
210 But cf. Gowder, supra note 1, at 340 (noting the simultaneous “social
unacceptability and yet persistence of some explicitly racist views”).
211 Another reason focuses on the culpable failure of state actors to address a
well-known bias that is not immediately apparent, but available to inspection
upon introspection.  Given that it has long been clear that “private actors of good
faith can voluntarily adopt best practices that decrease implicit bias and its mani-
festations,” it is not clear that the failure to act prophylactically is an innocent
one.  Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1494 (2005).
212 Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate:
Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 857 (2007).
213 Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism: Toward a Structural Interpreta-
tion, 62 AM. SOC. REV. 465, 469 (1996) (defining a “racialized social system” as one
in which “economic, political, social, and ideological levels are partially structured
by the placement of actors in racial categories or races”).  There is a range of
conceptual formulations of this system. Compare MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT,
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 84 (2d ed.
1994) (describing the racial order in the U.S. as “equilibrated by the state—
encoded in law, organized through policy-making, and enforced by a repressive
apparatus”), with MUSTAFA EMIRBAYER & MATTHEW DESMOND, THE RACIAL ORDER 88
(2015) (“Racial fields are organized in terms of the structure of distribution of
different types of capitals or assets, the most important being specifically racial
capital.”).
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scious effort.214  To show an improper bias on this view is to
proceed without accounting for the ways in which a classifica-
tion already organizes access to social, financial, and political
resources.  Intentions are thus understood not only in terms of
means and ends, but also in terms of omissions and suppres-
sions arising in an already racialized social structure.
Judicial doctrine under the First and the Fourteenth
Amendments largely ignores implicit bias and structural exclu-
sion.215 Doctrine in both domains is neutral in respect to the
specific ascriptive identity in play.  Formally, that is, the doc-
trine is supposed to be applied evenhandedly whether the com-
plaining litigant is Christian or Muslim, white or African-
American.216  Yet the thrust of both the implicit bias and struc-
tural exclusion theories is not to mistake surface neutrality for
practically equal treatment.  Each theory, in different ways,
posits dynamic forces (psychological or social) that render for-
mally neutral legal arrangements functionally inegalitarian.  By
resisting any asymmetries in the treatment of protected
groups, however, constitutional doctrine sets its face against
acknowledgement of both theories.
Yet it is far from clear that the theories of discriminatory
bias that underlie the doctrine support this exclusion.  Taste-
based discrimination posits quite simply that a person “dislikes
members of a minority group and does not want to associate
with them.”217  Becker’s model of labor markets characterized
by taste-based discrimination, like most rational choice mod-
els, focuses on how preferences are expressed through market
interactions.  The model does not require market participants’
articulation or even acknowledgment of discriminatory intent.
Conveying the same preferences in coded, yet legible, ways
seems both possible and probable.  Hence, there is no theoreti-
214 Cf. R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt, & Lee Ross, Discrimination
and Implicit Bias in A Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1171 (2006)
(“Pervasive racial inequality also complicates the question of what it would mean
to be racially unbiased.”).
215 The Court, however, has recognized the possibility of unconscious bias in
construing statutory anti-discrimination schemes.  In a recent decision constru-
ing the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), for example, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion
observed that “disparate-impact liability under the FHA also plays a role in uncov-
ering discriminatory intent: It permits plaintiffs to counteract unconscious
prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification as disparate
treatment.”  Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015).
216 But see Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization, supra note 176,
at 1287 (noting that white plaintiffs fare differently from minority plaintiffs in
gaining access to the courts).
217 Strauss, Racial Discrimination in Employment, supra note 158, at 1621.
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cal reason to exclude implicit bias from a doctrine of discrimi-
natory intent modeled on taste-based discrimination.  And
there is no dispute that discriminatory intent, for constitu-
tional purposes, includes taste-based discrimination.
Similarly, there is no a priori reason for a doctrinal scheme
crafted around statistical discrimination to exclude cases in
which implicit bias has a dispositive causal effect.  For exam-
ple, there is powerful evidence from audit studies of private
hiring decisions that employers use race as a proxy for crimi-
nality notwithstanding the availability of other information
about skills and employment history.218  Similar studies find
that apparently gay applicants are treated differently than
equally qualified heterosexual men at the threshold hiring
stage, especially when employers seek “stereotypically male
heterosexual traits.”219  Yet these effects from statistical dis-
crimination—in which negative inferences are drawn in respect
to expected job performance from the possession of static, non-
performative traits—do not in any way depend upon employer
awareness of their stereotypical cognitive process.  To the con-
trary, it seems plausible to posit that employers who do not
recognize the stereotypical bases for their decisional process
will be even more prone to fall back unconsciously on well-
worn templates of social action in making decisions than those
who are conscious of such stereotypes’ temptation.  To the ex-
tent that statistical discrimination motivates the constitutional
doctrine of discriminatory intent, therefore, there is no reason
to exclude notions of implicit bias.
In short, the doctrinal boundary between conscious forms
of discriminatory intent and unreflective forms—especially
when a function of unconscious processes—cannot be derived
from underlying theories of discriminatory intent.  It is rather
the Court that is responsible for gerrymandering the operative
doctrinal conception of bias to carve out these consequential
theories of discrimination in ways that want for theoretical
justification.
F. Accounting for the Diversity of Discriminatory Intents
“Discriminatory intent”—which is a key organizing term in
Equal Protection and the Religion Clause—is not a single con-
cept.  Rather, by drawing on economic, sociological, and psy-
218 See DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS
INCARCERATION 93–96 (2007).
219 Andra´s Tilcsik, Pride and Prejudice: Employment Discrimination against
Openly Gay Men in the United States, 117 AM. J. SOC. 586, 587–88 (2011).
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chological studies, this Part has illuminated the plural
conceptions of bias simultaneously at work in (or at the mar-
gins of) current doctrine.  These conceptions of bias operate as
complements in (or at the margins of) current doctrinal ar-
rangements, rather than as substitutes: Different judicial ap-
plications of the Constitution’s protections for vulnerable social
groups alternatively invoke taste-based discrimination when
invalidating municipal restrictions on Santeria, notions of sta-
tistical discrimination when policing political redistricting, an
anticlassification logic when constraining affirmative action
programs, and a grasp of group-status production dynamics
when invalidating interracial marriage prohibitions.
One further reason for this heterogeneity is historical.
Specific cases and accounts of the courts’ role in American
history play anchoring roles in judicial reasoning.220  Defini-
tional heterogeneity is unavoidable without abandoning canon-
ical precedent and stories within the historical canon of
antidiscrimination.  The repudiations of explicit racial segrega-
tion in the Jim Crow South, of the legitimate establishment of a
single national church, and of bars on interracial marriage—all
these are elements of our constitutional canon.  In each of
these cases, different species of discriminatory intent are at
work—including taste-based discrimination, group-status pro-
duction, and anticlassification.  The Court’s jurisprudence is
necessarily oriented by the concerns raised by these cases.  As
a result, it is likely to remain normatively plural.
Doctrine heterogeneity resulting from the plural ways in
which intent can figure in government decision-making and
historical precedent is not intrinsically problematic (although
the law’s current exclusion of unconscious bias lacks any ade-
quate justification).  But it would be better if the diversity of
discriminatory intents were frankly acknowledged.  Familiar
debates about the permissibility of affirmative action, about
when differential regulatory treatment of religion implicates a
constitutional concept, and about the legality of seemingly
evenhanded prohibitions on interracial and same-sex marriage
and intercourse—all of these in part hinge on the question of
which conception of discriminatory intent to prioritize.  This
question of taxonomy would be better confronted head on,
220 See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law,
111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 987 (1998) (noting the important role of “canonical narra-
tives” in constitutional jurisprudence); Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon,
and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 244 (1998) (identifying cases that serve
each as a “locus classicus of a major doctrine of constitutional law” and that
thereby “continue to shape the law today”).
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rather than in the Court’s current crab-wise, obfuscatory
fashion.
At present, moreover, judges have discretion not only to
move between different conceptions of discriminatory intent.
They also contract or expand those conceptions across differ-
ent cases. The boundaries between conceptions of unlawful
intent are ambiguous and contestable.  This gives judges a dis-
cretion that is rarely recognized and that operates without
meaningful discipline—a discretion to which I now turn.
III
THE DISCOVERY OF DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
This Part analyzes a second aspect of the judicial treatment
of discriminatory intent.  Focusing on decisions of the Supreme
Court, I explore the complex implications of the straightforward
fact that there exists a wide array of instruments for investigat-
ing allegations of discriminatory intent.  My analysis here is
organized around a taxonomy of the evidentiary tools employed
to identify when discriminatory intent has played a role in gov-
ernment decision-making.  These include the semantic context
of an official directive (such as a law or executive order); the
statements of officials; the context in which a policy was en-
acted, or its consequences once enacted; the results of deposi-
tions or interrogatories as elements of a pretrial discovery
process; and statistical evidence derived from econometric
analysis of the government’s action.
It is a striking and pervasive feature of the cases that the
permissibility and value of these materials is not framed as a
matter of evidence law generally or the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence in particular.  To the contrary, the evidentiary weighing
discussed in this Part exists at an angle to the latter body of
law.  As a result, my analysis trains on the discriminatory in-
tent case law narrowly, without trying to account for larger
evidence law questions.
The Supreme Court initially signaled its willingness to en-
tertain a wide range of evidentiary strategies for identifying
improper intent.  In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp., the Court recognized that the judi-
cial task of discovering “whether invidious discriminatory pur-
pose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into
such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be
available.”221
221 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
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While Arlington Heights is now known largely for its “moti-
vating factor” holding, and its concomitant rejection of the idea
that bias must be the sole or “dominant” factor,222 its approach
to evidence may well be as, or more, consequential.  The Court
in that case canvassed a wide range of evidence, including
disparate impact; “historical background,” including deviations
from normal government procedure; “contemporary state-
ments” by officials; and in “some extraordinary instances,” trial
testimony of decision-makers under oath.223  A similar ap-
proach is apparent in a roughly contemporaneous Establish-
ment Clause case in which the Court was willing to take
judicial notice of facts—such as Kentucky’s “plainly religious”
motive for posting the Decalogue in all classrooms—evident
from social context but hard to prove by traditional means.224
But this capacious and catholic approach to the discovery
of discriminatory intent is honored more in the breach than in
the observance.  In practice, even though Arlington Heights re-
mains formally ‘good’ law, the Court responds to different kinds
of evidence in erratic and uneven ways.  In respect to each
species of such evidence, it is possible to identify instances in
which the Court has been permissive.  It is also possible to
identify other instances in which it categorically rejects the
same kind of evidence.  Denying litigants license to introduce a
species of evidence, the Court typically appeals to the costs of
such permissions.225  But these cost estimates are persistently
based on fragile speculation, fail to account for alternative
ways of dealing with putative costs, and ignore the relevance of
other prohibitions on admissibility.226  Perhaps the most acute
example of such an interaction emerges in the criminal proce-
dure domain, where the Court has separately, and without any
cross-reference, resisted the two most important instruments
for discovering illicit intent—the ordinary tools of discovery and
the empirical study of overall patterns of state behavior.227
In working through the five species of evidence generally
available to show discriminatory intent, I will emphasize two
222 See id. at 265–66.
223 Id. at 266–68.
224 See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam).  Other Estab-
lishment Clause cases employed a similarly latitudinarian approach to discovery.
See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 57 (1985) (relying on a range of testimo-
nial and other sources to hold that Alabama’s moment-of-silence statute was
motivated by a desire to promote religion).
225 See infra subpart III.D.
226 See id.
227 See infra subparts III.D–E.
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overarching points.  First, I draw attention to the contrary
treatment of the same kind of evidence in distinct cases.  Sec-
ond, I challenge the reasons given for intermittently excluding
or disregarding evidence of improper motive, suggesting that
the Court has either exaggerated the costs of allowing evidence
to be considered or minimized the benefits from doing so.
Working in tandem, these lines of arguments provide support
for my ultimate argument in favor of a return to the more
generous Arlington Heights approach in Part IV—an approach
that does not rig doctrine to favor some claims of discrimina-
tory intent over others.
A. The Semantic Content of Laws and Regulations
The semantic content (or linguistic meaning)228 of govern-
ment action that is reduced to writing as a law or regulation (or
as the transcript of an oral intercession by an official) seems an
obvious and uncontroversial place to start the search for dis-
criminatory intent.  The logic of anticlassification in particular
places great emphasis on semantic content, whereas the ani-
mus and group-status production theories treat it as less cen-
tral.  Perhaps as a consequence, there are relatively few formal
legal measures today that explicitly incorporate a suspect clas-
sification.  Race is explicitly mentioned only now in remedial
measures employed in the secondary and tertiary education
contexts designed to respond to the continued absence of Afri-
can-Americans and other minorities (and even there, rarely
so).229  Religion is mentioned when a state, moved by Estab-
lishment Clause concerns, moves to bar religious groups’ ac-
cess to state funds or public forums.230  Neither kind of
measure fares well in court these days, reflecting the increas-
ing vulnerability of explicit usages of formal categories.
228 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 95, 98 (2010) (“The semantic content of a legal text is simply the
linguistic meaning of the text.”).
229 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2206 (2016) (involving the
University of Texas); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701, 710–11 (2007) (involving the Seattle and Jefferson County school
districts); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003) (involving the University of
Michigan).
230 See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct.
2012, 2024 (2017) (involving Missouri’s Scrap Tire Program).  For similar results
under a Free Speech rubric, see, for example, Good News Club v. Milford Cent.
Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001), which discussed New York law on the use of school
facilities, and Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of Virginia, 515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995), which discussed the University of Virginia’s Guidelines for pay-
ments from its Student Activity Fund.
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In some instances, moreover, courts have evinced careful
sensitivity to textual clues that an impermissible classification
provides a structuring principle from the law.  For instance, in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the
Court invalidated a Floridian municipal ordinance that was
“gerrymander[ed]” to prohibit Santeria ceremonies while per-
mitting many other kinds of animal killing.231  But in addition
to looking at the irregular pattern of exceptions and inclusions,
the Court also flagged the specific vocabulary used in the mea-
sure—such as the “use [of] the words ‘sacrifice’ and ‘ritual’”—
as evidence that a discomfort with religion motivated the
law.232  Words matter not only for their narrow dictionary-de-
fined content, but also for their unspoken, if readily available,
connotations.
A similar linguistic footprint is easily found in the March
2017 travel ban promulgated by President Trump.233  Like its
precursor, that order contains a peculiar and otherwise inex-
plicable reference to “honor killing.”234  That term is commonly
used solely to apply to Islamic contexts, notwithstanding the
tragic pervasiveness of intrafamilial violence against women in
many cultures, as a means to pejoratively taint Muslim men as
intrinsically violent.235  A case that does not mention a pro-
tected class by name but by a terminological proxy that is
easily discerned by the public—in effect, a rhetorical “dog whis-
tle” that seeks to invoke a negative stereotype about a suspect
classification236—is by logic no different from an instance in
which the verbal specification of the targeted group is incre-
mentally less occluded.  It was a religious ban in form as well as
colloquial name.
231 See 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664,
696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
232 Id. at 533–34.
233 See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017).
234 Id. at 13,217; see also Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27,
2017) (“[T]he United States should not admit those who engage in acts of bigotry
or hatred (including ‘honor’ killings . . . .”).
235 See Lila Abu-Lughod, Seductions of the “Honor Crime”, 22 DIFFERENCES 17,
18 (2011) (“Honor crimes are explained as the behavior of a specific ethnic or
cultural community.  The culture itself is taken to be the cause of the criminal
violence.  Thus the category stigmatizes not a particular act but entire cultures or
ethnic communities.”); see also Inderpal Grewal, Outsourcing Patriarchy: Feminist
Encounters, Transnational Mediations and the Crime of ‘Honour Killings’, 15 INT’L
FEMINIST J. POL. 1, 2–3 (2013).
236 See generally IAN HANEY-LO´PEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL
APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM & WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 218–31 (2014)
(exploring the use of coded appeals to racial animus in American politics).
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But it would be a mistake to think that the infusion of a
formal legal text or instruction with an impermissible classifi-
cation will always be grounds for quick invalidation.  A surpris-
ingly large number of common government practices turn on
the deployment of a suspect classification—and yet have re-
mained beyond judicial purview.  For example, even though
race is a common trait employed in police suspect descriptions
used by local, state, and federal law enforcement, federal
courts have not expended significant effort in considering their
constitutionality.237  Challenges to race-specific suspect selec-
tion are routinely turned aside by the federal courts.238  Simi-
larly, the family law domain is characterized by “racial
permissiveness” with officials routinely employing race to make
decisions with large and immediate repercussions for particu-
lar individuals.239  No explanation has been tendered for these
exceptions.  There is also no reason such gaps in judicial scru-
tiny cannot expand in the future.
Nevertheless, the semantic content of a law remains cen-
tral in most other contexts.  As a result, restrictions upon other
mechanisms for proving discriminatory intent tend to make the
semantic context of a law more important.  Anticlassification
theories fit most comfortably on a foundation of semantic
meaning (and nothing else).  Hence, isolating semantic mean-
ing as the sole or preferred evidence of discriminatory intent is
a way of collapsing the definition of discriminatory intent, and
training solely upon anticlassification.240  In this way, a judge
can recalibrate the scope of constitutional prohibitions without
changing the formal content of substantive constitutional
doctrine.
237 See supra text accompanying note 163. R
238 See, e.g., Monroe v. City of Charlottesville, 579 F.3d 380, 387–90 (4th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1740 (2010) (denying certiorari in a case exempting
race-based suspect selection from equal protection scrutiny); Brown v. City of
Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 333–34 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 816 (2001)
(denying the same); see also Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing:
Evaluating Stop and Frisk As A Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397,
2446 (2017) (discussing judicial refusals to account for the constitutional conse-
quences of race’s use in policing).
239 See Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 537, 540–41 (2014) (“Constitutional challenges to these race-based actions
have generally fared poorly, with courts typically (albeit not always) applying de
minimis constitutional scrutiny.”); accord R. Richard Banks, The Color of Desire:
Fulfilling Adoptive Parents’ Racial Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action,
107 YALE L.J. 875, 904–08 (1998).
240 Haney-Lo´pez has argued that “Justices from Feeney to McCleskey were
prepared to uphold the challenged practices with or without the animus standard.
They never looked for governmental motives.”  Haney-Lo´pez, supra note 49, at R
1858.  As the main text makes clear, I think this is an exaggeration.
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B. Official Statements
It sometimes happens that an official responsible for a
state action makes a statement to another person that provides
prima facie evidence of an improper intent.  It might seem that
such a “statement against interest”241 would be especially pro-
bative of the existence of one or another form of discriminatory
intent, especially where animus and group-status production
are suspected.242  Indeed, such statements often figure promi-
nently in constitutional discrimination cases.  For example, in
the 2017 North Carolina racial gerrymandering case discussed
in the Introduction, the Court identified statements on the
state-senate floor made by legislators responsible for mapmak-
ing, that they felt they “must include a sufficient number of
African-Americans” in the challenged district.243  The Court
further relied on trial testimony from another state legislator to
the effect that mapmakers had expressed the same racial aim
to him.244
In a similar vein, when ascertaining the “purpose” of the
Defense of Marriage Act in Windsor, the Court looked to a
House Committee Report that pointed to “traditional (especially
Judeo-Christian) morality” as a basis for the measure.245  In
evaluating Alabama’s statute authorizing a daily moment of
silence in schools, the Court also looked to the statements of
the measure’s sponsors and took account of his confirmatory
statements before the district court.246  And in the recent chal-
lenge to juror discrimination under the Sixth Amendment, the
Court declined to treat the jury as a sealed black box after
evidence of improper motive had emerged.247  Finally, such
statements remain one of the few means of proving up the
241 Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (establishing hearsay exception for a statement
against interest, which “a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would
have made only if the person believed it to be true because, when made, it was so
contrary to the declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great a
tendency to invalidate the declarant’s claim against someone else or to expose the
declarant to civil or criminal liability”).
242 Much depends, though, on what one means by “interest.”  It may be that
an official appeals to invidious grounds because it is in his or her electoral inter-
est, even though it works against the legality of the relevant position.
243 Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1468 (2017).
244 See id. at 1476 (discussing trial testimony of Congressman Mel Watt).
245 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (citing and discuss-
ing H.R. REP. NO. 104–664 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905).
246 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 57–58 (1985).
247 See Pen˜a-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017) (“[W]here a
juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes
or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires that the
no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the
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presence of bias in the criminal justice system more
generally.248
Nevertheless, there are ways to deflect the evidentiary force
of statements that are immediately probative of unconstitu-
tional intent.  The Court can carve out categories of constitu-
tional challenges for resolution without regard to such
evidence, even when obvious and powerful proof of bias exists.
By crafting exceptions strategically, the Court can render irrel-
evant otherwise probative materials in circumstances where
other forms of evidence may be unlikely to emerge.249
An instructive example arises in the Establishment Clause
context of challenges to features of the physical landscape cre-
ated by the state with an explicitly religious message.  Ordina-
rily, both the religious and the sectarian content of such
measures are evident quite literally on the face of such monu-
ments.  Because their sponsors have no wish to shy away from
sectarian endorsements, moreover, statements against consti-
tutional interest are not uncommon.  A plurality of the Court in
a 2005 case concerning a stone inscription of the Decalogue on
the grounds of the Texas State Capital, however, suggested
that the purpose test employed in Establishment Clause juris-
prudence was “not useful,” and instead, looked at “the nature
of the monument and . . . our Nation’s history.”250
But why?  The plurality opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist
did not explain why the concept of purpose—which, as we have
seen, is employed across a wide range of other doctrinal and
institutional contexts—was inapposite in respect to monu-
ments.  Indeed, given that such monuments are typically cre-
ated at a specific moment after a specific sequence of state
evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the jury trial
guarantee.”).
248 See, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747–55 (2016) (holding that
the Georgia Supreme Court had made a “clearly erroneous” decision when it
declined to find that prosecution’s use of preemptory strikes in a capital case was
not animated by a discriminatory purpose in the face of lurid evidence to the
contrary); see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008).  Outside the
context of Equal Protection and the Religion Clauses, the Court has said that a
“prosecutor’s disclosure of retaliatory thinking on his part, for example, would be
of great significance” when adjudicating a constitutional claim.  Hartman v.
Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 264 (2006).
249 Alternatively, courts can simply refuse to take notice of the use of, say,
racially charged language in the enactment of a criminal statute—as David Sklan-
sky argues they have done in regard to the former sentencing provisions for crack
cocaine. See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 1283, 1303–04 (1995).
250 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality
opinion).
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actions and deliberations, they present straightforward cases
for purpose analysis.  By contrast, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
substitute analytic framework is notable largely because it is
inherently ambiguous (what constitutes the “nature” of a mon-
ument?) and open-ended (what parts of “our Nation’s history”
are relevant?).251  The Court hence creates an exception to the
purpose rule for cases in which probative evidence is likely to
be easily and readily available—and fails to offer persuasive (or,
indeed, any) reasons for its abrogation.  Concern must arise
about the deployment of shifting evidentiary rules to achieve
substantive ends that the Court has not explicated or justified.
It is a sub rosa way of expunging all forms of intent-focused
analysis canvassed in Part II—including anticlassification
analysis—from the constitutional lexicon where a historical re-
ligious majority favors a challenged practice.
Another argument for resisting judicial consideration of
facially compromising statements focuses on the incentive ef-
fects of such a rule.  In the juror bias case discussed above,
Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion thus celebrated the jury’s
ability “to speak, debate, argue, and make decisions the way
ordinary people do in their daily lives.”252  In the challenge to
the travel ban case, the government has argued in similar
terms that campaign statements should not be admissible evi-
dence of impermissible bias on the part of an elected official
lest democratic debate be chilled.253  But such incentive-based
arguments are at best speculative and at worst specious.
Consider first the jury case.  Justice Alito’s key theoretical
premise is that juries should work as miniature versions of the
democratic polity.  This is a claim that is flawed as a matter of
both history and practice.254  The “aim of a jury is explicitly
epistemic,” not representational.255  Jury deliberations are not
251 Cf. B. Jessie Hill, Of Christmas Trees and Corpus Christi: Ceremonial Deism
and Change in Meaning over Time, 59 DUKE L.J. 705, 731 (2010) (concluding that
“courts have not analyzed the constitutionality of brief official religious references,
often referred to as ceremonial deism, in a thorough or nuanced way”).
252 Pen˜a-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 874 (Alito, J., dissenting).
253 See Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order of the Executive Or-
der at 28–32, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir.
2017) (No. 17-00361) (“Permitting campaign statements to contradict official pro-
nouncements of the government’s objectives would inevitably ‘chill political de-
bate during campaigns.’”).
254 See Melissa Schwartzberg, Democracy, Judgment, and Juries, in MAJORITY
DECISIONS: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 196, 196–97 (Ste´phanie Novak & Jon Elster
eds., 2014) (noting that jury selection has not, as a historic matter, been along
democratic grounds).
255 Id. at 196–97.
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“ordinary” speech familiar from “daily lives.”  Rather, they arise
in a legally structured environment in which lay judgments are
exhorted on specific questions of law and fact.256  The existence
of a pervasive bias against a certain group in “ordinary” society
does not legitimate the recapitulation of that bias in jury delib-
erations.  To the contrary, norms against the expression of ir-
relevant and distortionary tropes that characterize demotic
speech promote the jury’s specialized epistemic and adjudica-
tive functions.257
Similarly, a powerful critique could be mounted against the
Government’s argument in the travel ban case respecting the
admission of campaign speech.  To begin with, candidates
seeking to play on discriminatory sentiments among the public
are unlikely to be chilled by the prospect of litigation (which
might simply allow them to amplify their rhetoric and include
federal judges among their targets).  Where pre-election rheto-
ric tracks post-election action, moreover, there are good Baye-
sian grounds for concluding that the earlier rhetoric was not
mere puffery.  Finally, it is passing odd to reject evidence on the
ground that candidates should not be understood to mean
what they say prior to an election: It might instead be more
compatible with the democratic commitments of the Constitu-
tion to make precisely the opposite assumption as a way of
taking seriously the electoral structures created in Articles I
and II.  Those who urge the disregard of campaign statements
implicitly treat the democratic process as little more than a
cheap vaudeville—bright lights, thickly caked makeup, and
naught of enduring substance.
More generally, it is hard to conceive of reasons to ignore
statements—already made and available as proof—when their
content provides prima facie evidence of improper intent.  The
exceptions to this rule, whether in the doctrine or offered in
current cases, are unpersuasive and should be abandoned.
256 Note the tension between Justice Alito’s argument and arguments to ex-
clude campaign statements in the travel ban case.  Jurors’ statements do not
count even if they arise within patterned legal structures; a candidate’s state-
ments do not count because they do not arise within patterned legal structures.
257 Justice Alito’s argument might alternatively be understood as follows: al-
though naked expressions of bias (as occurred in Pen˜a-Rodriguez) are never use-
ful or proper, there is a grey area in which jurors might be chilled from discussing
facts pertinent to a verdict.  It is not at all obvious, however, that this domain
exists, and it requires further speculation to conclude that the remote and uncer-
tain prospect of judicial inquiry would have any effect at all on such juror behav-
ior.  Moreover, the benefits of discouraging invidious speech that has neither
epistemic value nor normative content likely outweigh the fragile benefits of avoid-
ing an evanescent chilling effect.
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C. Circumstantial Evidence: History and Consequences
Discriminatory intent is often inferable from circumstan-
tial evidence that takes a variety of forms.  The Court in Arling-
ton Heights, for example, identified the “specific sequence of
events” preceding the challenged decision, “[d]epartures from
the normal procedural sequence,” and a more general category
of “legislative or administrative history.”258  A similar proce-
dure was said to govern Establishment Clause challenges,
which are evaluated within the “history of the government’s
actions.”259
Arlington Heights’ list is unfinished.  A somewhat trivial
missing item is the physical setting of a measure challenged on
Establishment Clause grounds.260  But more substantial and
generalizable omissions exist.  For instance, a mismatch be-
tween expected consequences and legitimate policy justifica-
tions can undermine the assumption that the latter motivated
a law.  In Romer v. Evans, for example, the Court concluded
that Colorado’s Amendment 2, which prohibited most legisla-
tive, executive, or judicial action designed to protect homosex-
ual persons from discrimination, “raise[d] the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected.”261  The outcome of Romer
did not depend on a direct evaluation of the voting public’s
intent.  Instead, it was justified by the Court’s observation that
Amendment 2 was “so discontinuous with the reasons offered
for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but
animus toward the class it affects.”262 Romer then rested on an
inference from the means-ends rationality of a single policy
measure—an index of bias typically unavailable when the ob-
258 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267–68
(1977).  This is not to say that any one of these factors is necessary.  Indeed, the
Court has resisted efforts to calcify the Arlington Heights factors in given contexts.
See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 799 (2017)
(“[A] conflict or inconsistency between the enacted plan and traditional redistrict-
ing criteria is not a threshold requirement or a mandatory precondition in order
for a challenger to establish a claim of racial gerrymandering . . . .”).  Even in the
immediate wake of the Arlington Heights decision, moreover, the Court at times
“disregard[ed] contextual evidence in unprincipled ways.”  Haney-Lo´pez, supra
note 49, at 1843 (discussing City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981)). R
259 McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 866 (2005); see Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (looking to the “text and history” of a policy
challenged on Establishment Clause grounds).
260 In a perhaps unintentionally comic line, the Court once declared with
Solomonic seriousness that “the cre`che stands alone” as a way of distinguishing
earlier precedent.  Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598 (1989).
261 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996).
262 Id. at 632.
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ject of the popular franchise is a person or a political party that
represents a cluster of policies and values.
Context and consequences are likely to be of greatest sali-
ence when animus, statistical discrimination, or group-status
production are at issue.  They will generally matter less in an-
ticlassification challenges.  The doctrinal instruments for hid-
ing context from judicial consideration therefore push toward
an anticlassification analysis, while relegating other theories of
discriminatory intent to the back-burner.
Perhaps the most important doctrinal barrier to serious
consideration of context is the idea of deference to a putatively
expert official, a deference that obviates the need to consider
contextual clues that impermissible intent was at stake.
Judges vary, however, in their willingness to exercise such def-
erence across different contexts, often in unprincipled ways.
The willingness to look beyond the reasons supplied for an
official decision seemingly fluctuates in accord with judges’ pri-
ors about a given class of officials.
The problem is not the preserve of one or the other ideologi-
cal wing of the bench.  On the one hand, liberal judges have
evinced deference to university administrators’ use of classifi-
cations and rules that raise concerns about the role of both
race and religion.  Endorsing a state university’s imposition of a
nondiscrimination requirement on all student groups that
sought funding from the public fisc, for instance, a liberal ma-
jority of the Supreme Court underscored its “appropriate re-
gard for school administrators’ judgment” in determining how
best to promote educational goals.263  In dissent, Justice Alito
highlighted facts tending to suggest that administrators had
been hostile to the plaintiff student groups based on their relig-
ious nature.264  By contrast, Justice Alito (as well as Justice
Thomas), viewed the Trump travel ban through a Vaseline-
smeared lens of deference akin to the one they had criticized
only a few years before.265  More generally, conservative jus-
tices seem more comfortable embracing those who exercise
263 Christian Legal Soc. Chapter v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 687 (2010).
264 See id. at 717–18 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing failures of a university
administrator to respond to requests for group registrations).  For a parallel com-
plaint about excessive deference to university administrators’ judgments about
race in the affirmative action context, see Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198,
2215 (2016) (Alito. J., dissenting).
265 See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2089–90
(2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting “the
Government has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-5\CRN503.txt unknown Seq: 66 30-AUG-18 12:31
1276 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 103:1211
force—police or national security officials—as experts warrant-
ing deference.
The general question of deference to officials on the basis of
expertise and political accountability is a large one.266  But the
specific question raised by these cases is quite narrow—and
also rather easy to answer.  When a judge must answer the
factual question whether an agency official has acted on the
basis of an unconstitutional motive, standard justifications for
deference based on expertise and political accountability are
not relevant.  The policy expertise of, say, university adminis-
trators in the University of California system or career staffers
to the National Security Council has no bearing on the question
whether they acted with a discriminatory intent.  There is no
logical relation between expertise and a fair disposition toward
vulnerable social groups.  Nor does the logic of democratic ac-
countability supply any reason to defer to an official’s factual
claim that they acted on the basis of proper motives rather
than unlawful bias.267
At best, expertise may be relevant if a defendant official
points to evidence that they in fact relied on their bespoke
knowledge and skills in riposte to a bias allegation.  But when
evaluating the factual question whether a plaintiff’s allegation,
or this response, is a more persuasive account of historical
events, there is no reason to favor a priori one side in that
dispute.
More generally, there is a long-standing consensus among
scholars that even expert administrative agencies have no spe-
cial competence as to the specification of constitutional
rules.268  It follows from this position a fortiori that officials
266 For a crisp statement of this familiar point, and a collection of sources, see
Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference Di-
lemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1765 (2012).
267 The standard—and most powerful—explanation for counter-majoritarian
protection of minorities defined on racial or religious grounds is that the demo-
cratic process does not work well to protect their interests. See JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 152 (1980) (expressing concern for minorities “barred
from the pluralist’s bazaar”); Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in
the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1296 (1982) (describing groups that
need constitutional protection because they are “perpetual losers” in the political
arena).
268 See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77
TEX. L. REV. 113, 194 (1998) (“[C]ourts never defer to agencies in reading the
Constitution.”); Michael Skocpol, The Emerging Constitutional Law of Prison Ger-
rymandering, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1473, 1517 (2017) (arguing that courts “should not
defer to executive agencies when the underlying question is one of constitutional
interpretation”); David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 146
(2010) (“De novo review is appropriate when agencies are interpreting laws that
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should obtain no particular deference when it comes to factual
findings that are necessary predicates to the application of a
constitutional antidiscrimination rule.269  To grant such defer-
ence would create a special dispensation to violate constitu-
tional rules when their application turned on questions of
disputable fact.270
Once again, the reasons for categorically excluding or ig-
noring the evidence of discriminatory intent in the form of con-
text and consequences—wholly prior to litigation—are at best
fragile.  Once again, it seems there is little reason to carve out
distinct exceptions to how plaintiffs can go about proving an
unlawfully discriminatory intent, especially when doing so dis-
advantages plaintiffs suffering under the various forms of dis-
criminatory intent to varying extents.
D. The Mechanisms of Civil Discovery
Of course, in many cases, no smoking-gun statement by an
official will be available.271  And, often, the circumstances and
consequences of policymaking will be empirically murky, their
interpretation amenable to sharply conflicting takes.  The con-
sequences of statistical discrimination in particular will be
often observationally equivalent to reliance on a permissible
trait.  No clear inference of improper motive may be discerned
from semantic content, context, or immediate consequences.
As a result, mundane mechanisms of civil discovery such as
interrogatories, depositions, and document production may be
especially important in substantiating the presence of discrimi-
natory intent that takes the form of animus, group-status pro-
duction, or statistical discrimination.272
they do not have a special responsibility to administer, like the Constitution, the
APA, or Title VII.”).
269 In David Faigman’s influential typology, there are “facts peculiar to the
dispute and which must be examined under the pertinent constitutional rule.”
David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 553 (1991).
270 A separate question is presented when an agency argues that a law is
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest.  But that question of
fact does not arise until after a discriminatory intent has been identified.
271 See Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 112 (2012)
(“Proof of intent is rarely direct.  It is usually circumstantial, even multi-
determined.”).
272 See Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Be-
cause employers rarely leave a paper trail—or ‘smoking gun’—[of] discriminatory
intent . . . plaintiffs often must build their cases from pieces of circumstantial
evidence which cumulatively undercut the [defendant’s] credibility . . . .” (citations
omitted)).
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From the beginning of intent-focused antidiscrimination
jurisprudence, however, federal courts have been
preternaturally cautious about civil discovery against the gov-
ernment.  The Arlington Heights Court, for example, described
the use of trial testimony (although not discovery) as “ex-
traordinary.”273  Since then, the Supreme Court and lower
courts have evinced a rising hostility to statutory discrimina-
tion cases more generally.274  Perhaps with those cases in
mind, the Justices have implemented a series of procedural
changes, including to the well-pleaded complaint rule and the
summary judgment regime.275  These have had “a disparate
impact on employment discrimination and civil rights cases”
against both private and state actors, insofar as the latter tend
to be more dependent on pretrial discovery than other species
of cases.276
Nevertheless, civil discovery and trial testimony remain im-
portant ways to find evidence of discriminatory intent.  For
example, in a legal challenge to Alabama’s 2012 redistricting of
its House and Senate seats, the Court looked to evidence from
a sequence of depositions “to show that the legislature had
deliberately moved black voters into . . . majority-minority dis-
tricts.”277  The dissent did not object to the legality of such
depositions.  It instead argued that more effective use of “dis-
covery and trial” would be necessary to demonstrate that spe-
cific districts had been improperly drawn.278
By contrast, discovery is generally not available when the
Court deems it likely to be costly or an infringement on the
prerogatives of the executive branch.  This perception has been
most acute when the state acts coercively against specific indi-
viduals—a context in which animus and statistical discrimina-
tion are more likely to be present than group-status production
or anticlassification concerns.  In a series of cases cross-cut-
273 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 268
(1977).
274 See Gertner, supra note 271, at 109 (reporting, based on author’s experi- R
ence as a federal judge, that “[f]ederal courts . . . were hostile to discrimination
cases”).
275 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial
Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination
Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 523–24 (2010).
276 Id. at 524–25.
277 Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1266 (2015).
For other discussions of the use of evidence yielded by civil discovery in racial
gerrymander cases, see Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1475 (2017) and League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 452 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
278 Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. at 1277 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ting the criminal law and immigration law fields—i.e., the mo-
dal forms of individuated coercive state action today—the
Court has imposed functionally insurmountable barriers to
discovery.  For example, in the context of racially selective pros-
ecution claims, the Court in United States v. Armstrong prohib-
ited discovery unless a defendant can produce “some evidence
that similarly situated defendants of other races could have
been prosecuted, but were not.”279  Of course, since such de-
fendants were not prosecuted in federal court (and were un-
likely to have been charged in state court), it will rarely be the
case that documentary evidence of their existence will be avail-
able.280  In the immigration-removal context, the Court has
simply ruled out selective enforcement claims about “outra-
geous” discrimination.281  In the visa-issuance context (where
the relevant state actor is typically a consular official located
extraterritorially), it has deferred to the “facially legitimate and
bona fide” decisions of consular officials.282
These deference regimes, which regulate both access to
pretrial discovery and to trial, are justified first, in terms of the
deadweight costs of selective prosecution claims283 and sec-
ond, in terms of a constitutional worry about judicial interfer-
ence with “a core executive constitutional function.”284  But
both of those justifications for constrained discovery are far
weaker than first appearances might suggest.
Of course, constitutional antidiscrimination rules should
constrain prosecutorial discretion.285  The only question here
is whether discovery imposes excessive costs. But it is not at all
clear that permitting more extensive discovery would have such
279 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996).  In the context of
discriminatory use of preemptory strikes, a defendant can invoke a hearing but
not discovery. See Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed
Motives and Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 346–47 (2007).
280 See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the
Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 618–19 (1998).
281 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 491
(1999).
282 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972); accord Kerry v. Din, 135
S. Ct. 2128, 2140 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
283 See AADC, 525 U.S. at 490; Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; see also Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (“Examining the basis of a prosecution
delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting
the prosecutor’s motives and decision making to outside inquiry, and may under-
mine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government’s enforcement
policy.”).
284 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465.
285 See United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979).  The immigra-
tion context presents distinct questions; for instance, there is a threshold ques-
tion whether a specific individual benefits from constitutional protections.
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costs.  Although not an exact parallel, states’ experiences with
so-called “open file” policies are instructive.  Several states
have adopted various iterations of an open-file policy, by which
defendants have broad access to materials in a prosecutor’s
files.286  These policies, however, have not led to dramatic
changes in clearance rates or case processing, perhaps be-
cause public defenders’ resources tend to be sufficiently con-
strained so as to preclude their aggressive exploitation of open-
file policies.287  That is, allowing discovery by default does not
impose deadweight costs that reduce the rate of prosecutions.
State-level experience with open-file policies, therefore, under-
mine the Court’s concern with the disruptive effect of increas-
ing discovery of prosecutorial motivations.  Compounding the
minimal effect of greater discovery, it seems quite likely that
judges would be reluctant to impose “extreme” sanctions such
as the dismissal of charges even when evidence of bias did
surface.288  Hence, it is far from clear that more discovery
would change the outcome of specific cases (even if it changes
the mix of cases filed).  Given that concerns about prosecutorial
discretion are often taken as the paradigmatic case justifying
limited evidentiary discovery, it is reasonable to worry that
more peripheral cases will involve even weaker governmental
anti-disclosure justifications.
Moreover, it is striking that the Court has cracked open, if
only slightly, the jury room to allow inquiry into discriminatory
intent, while keeping prosecutorial discretion shrouded from
view.  Juries have long been a vanishingly small part of the
criminal justice system.289  In contrast, prosecutors exercise
vast authority as a result of their charging and plea bargaining
authority on criminal justice matters.290  Prosecutorial deci-
286 See Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery, 49 CONN. L.
REV. 771, 789 (2017) (noting variation in forms of open-file discovery).
287 See id. at 796 (finding based on analysis of several states’ experience that
“open-file may not reduce the trial rate or speed up pleas”).
288 Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 254
(2017).  Indeed, it is far from clear that courts can ever serve as robust supervisors
of prosecutorial behavior.  Their limited institutional capacity means such over-
sight will always be seriously incomplete. See Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial
Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 1016
(2009) (“Conventional external regulation has failed to guide prosecutors.  It can-
not work well because outsiders lack the information, capacity, and day-to-day
oversight to structure patterns of decisions.”).  Structural limitations of this sort
further diminish defendants’ incentives to use extensive discovery beyond what
Armstrong and Wayte allow.
289 See Bibas, supra note 288, at 961. R
290 See id. at 971 (describing the prosecutor’s “dominant” role).  This has long
been the case. See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 AM. INST. CRIM.
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sions are also “important” sources of racial disparities, espe-
cially decisions about mandatory minimums.291  To the extent
that public confidence in the criminal justice system is a func-
tion of the actual influence of race-based decision making, cur-
rent doctrine thus seems to have its priorities backward.
Allowing greater discovery of prosecutors’ intent may deter
what appears to be a significant effect of unconstitutional bias.
It would also eliminate any marginal incentive for a prosecutor
to use a plea bargain rather than a trial given the knowledge
that jurors’ racial biases may be more readily exposed than
prosecutors’.
E. Statistical Evidence
The final kind of evidence useful for demonstrating uncon-
stitutional discrimination is the output of econometric models
that estimate either the causal effect of a suspect classification
in government action or, alternatively, identify correlations be-
tween the distribution of that classification and the state’s im-
position of costs on the public.  Evidence of this sort is also
useful to root out the use of impermissible criteria as proxies
for other goals.  By contrast, it is not needed in anticlassifica-
tion challenges.
Judicial attitudes to statistical evidence of race discrimina-
tion have been inconsistent.  On the one hand, judges embrace
such evidence in the context of gerrymandering cases, where it
helps tease out the correlations between districting and race,
partisanship, and other relevant factors with precision.292  On
the other hand, the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp rejected the
use of system-wide empirical evidence of racial disparities to
demonstrate discriminatory intent on the part of a specific
jury.293  While McCleskey focused on the inference of intent
from systemic characteristics—i.e., the role of race in the Geor-
gia capital punishment system as a whole—to specific criminal
proceedings, lower courts have extended its holding to the
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 (1940) (“The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty,
and reputation than any other person in America.”).
291 See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial
Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE
L.J. 2, 10 (2013).  The same authors analyze the sources for racial disparities
across the criminal justice process and identify prosecutors’ charging decisions as
key to the production of those disparities. See Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr,
Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1321–22
(2014).
292 See, e.g., Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1477–78 (2017) (describing the
introduction of expert econometric analysis).
293 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–93 (1987).
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quite different context of statistical evidence about the role of
race in a single decision-maker’s actions over time (e.g., a sin-
gle district attorney over a number of years).294  By contrast,
challenges to policing policies, such as stop and frisk, have at
times turned in part on statistical evidence that the distribu-
tion of police actions cannot be explained by the historical dis-
tribution of crimes, but are instead closely correlated to racial
demographics.295
Judicial skepticism of econometric evidence of impermissi-
ble motives is unwarranted and unwise.  To begin with, the
McCleskey Court criticized the study of the Georgia capital
punishment system presented in that case because it did not
“prove that race enters into any capital sentencing decisions,”
but only “show[s] . . . a likelihood” of this impermissible re-
sult.296  This is true, but also irrelevant.  Most sophisticated
econometric analysis of a complex phenomenon characterized
by multiple potential causal predicates will entail several model
specifications, each of which assumes a different set of struc-
tural relationships between tested variables.  The coefficients
derived from such models—say, of race effects—are not an un-
mediated measure of causal or correlational effects.  They re-
quire careful interpretation.297  What the McCleskey Court took
to be a criticism is thus a persistent quality of econometric
evidence: It always and only “show[s] . . . a likelihood” of
bias.298  It is not “proof” in the same form as an inculpatory oral
statement.  But this is all the more reason not to dismiss it
categorically.  It is precisely because statistical evidence is al-
most never determinative on its own, but rather grist to a pro-
cess of Bayesian inference that accounts for other factors, that
its admission is not as disruptive and destabilizing as the Mc-
294 See John H. Blume et. al., Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in
Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 1794–95 (1998).
295 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 435–36 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); see also Andrew Gelman, Jeffrey Fagan & Alex Kiss, An Analysis of the
New York City Police Department’s “Stop and Frisk” Policy in the Context of Claims
of Racial Bias, 102 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 813, 817–18 (2007) (presenting the
econometric analysis relevant to Floyd in greater detail).
296 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308.
297 See, e.g., James B. Grace & Kenneth A. Bollen, Interpreting the Results
from Multiple Regression and Structural Equation Models, 86 BULL. ECOLOGICAL
SOC. AM. 283, 285–86 (2005) (describing the error of drawing inferences from
unstandardized coefficients and exploring the inferences available based on stan-
dardized coefficients).
298 As has long been known to legal scholars. Cf. Julia Lamber et al., The
Relevance of Statistics to Prove Discrimination: A Typology, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 553,
582 (1983).
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Clesky Court feared (or perhaps, as catalytic as its proponents
might hope).
A more promising approach to statistical evidence in the
criminal justice context is reflected in a 1977 case in which the
Court found proof of substantial deviations between a racial
group’s representation on juries and its presence in the popu-
lation at large.  This evidence, in conjunction with a jury selec-
tion system susceptible to abuse, was identified as a prima
facie equal protection violation.299  That is, econometric results
provided a basis for inference—not proof per se—much like
most other sorts of evidence.  In that spirit, the judge tasked
with investigating discriminatory intent should embrace statis-
tical findings for their modest, but important, role of eviden-
tiary support.300  Their general exclusion in the criminal justice
context after McClesky is especially unfortunate since that con-
text is one in which animus and statistical discrimination are
often best flushed out using econometric tools.
F. The State of (Evidentiary) Play
Scholars have to date paid little attention to the evolving
strategies of proof available to litigants alleging discriminatory
intent under the Constitution.  But this has been a domain of
dramatic and consequential change.  This Part has demon-
strated that granular shifts in these evidentiary doctrines can
and do drive change over the forms and loci of justiciable dis-
crimination, even as the Court makes no formal change to the
substantive law of Equal Protection and the Religion Clauses.
The contrast with older doctrine is striking: When it en-
throned intent as the axiomatic term in the Constitution’s pro-
tection of vulnerable social minorities, the Court embraced a
broad and varied range of evidentiary tools.  This appropriately
flexible approach has largely vanished in favor of a more erratic
and haphazard methodology.
The Court has offered a range of justifications for refusing
to attend to officials’ public statements, declining to account
for statistical evidence, and ignoring context and history.  But
these justifications have consistently been flawed.  The case for
299 See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 n.13, 496–97 n.17 (1977).
300 By contrast, courts increasingly allow, and even demand, econometric evi-
dence when agencies act in the form of cost-benefit analysis. See Michigan v.
EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (requiring agency quantification of costs, as
well as benefits); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009)
(holding that the EPA was permitted to use cost-benefit analysis in the face of an
ambiguous statute).
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categorical exclusions from the evidentiary toolkit for proving
discriminatory intent, therefore, is weak even if one limits the
analysis to the considerations proffered by the Justices
themselves.
IV
RECONSTRUCTING THE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT
This Part develops two external critiques of current ar-
rangements for discovering discriminatory intent based on its
distributional and epistemic effects.  It then articulates the ba-
sic elements of a more evenhanded doctrinal framework that
accounts for the full range of conceptions of discriminatory
intent. As importantly, the approach proposed here does not
tilt the playing field away from any subset of meritorious dis-
crimination claims.
My aim in this Part, to be clear, is not to recapitulate the
hoary contest between anticlassificatory and alternate con-
cepts of discriminatory intent.  Rather, it is to demonstrate that
a manageable, principled, and transparent doctrinal structure
for evaluating both these and other kinds of discrimination
claims is within reach.  It could be used instead of current
arrangements for discovering discriminatory intent—even as
disagreement persists about which conception of discrimina-
tory intent to prioritize.
A. The Substantive Effects of Evolving Rules for
Discovering Bias
A threshold consequence of changes to the evidentiary ap-
proaches to discriminatory intent has been to make certain
conceptions of intent increasingly immune from constitutional
scrutiny.  By opening, closing, or narrowing different eviden-
tiary pathways by which a party asserting a constitutional right
might be able to demonstrate an improper motive, the judiciary
nudges the burden of constitutional constraint from one insti-
tution to another.
Consider an example of the way in which the doctrine
pushes judicial scrutiny between different loci of potential dis-
crimination: Large institutions such as schools and universi-
ties necessarily operate through the internal promulgation of
written regulations and guidance to discrete officials.  Their
reliance on such guidance—say, when determining admissions
or regulating student groups—means they necessarily depend
on written commands between hierarchically-situated officials.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\103-5\CRN503.txt unknown Seq: 75 30-AUG-18 12:31
2018] WHAT IS DISCRIMINATORY INTENT? 1285
The semantic context of such commands is almost always go-
ing to be available as evidence in discriminatory intent cases
and now will almost always be amenable to discovery.
By contrast, in the criminal justice context, smaller prose-
cution offices may not need to formalize orders in writing.  And
if impermissible criteria are invoked in internal documents, it
is unlikely that these will be flushed out through litigation after
Armstrong.  Moreover, judicial skepticism about statistical evi-
dence bars the indirect demonstration of impermissible consid-
erations in prosecutorial decisions.  Hence, although
McCleskey and Armstrong do not cite each other, they have an
important interaction insofar as they simultaneously block the
two most important pathways to proving up impermissible in-
tent in the criminal justice context.
This means that it is harder (all else being equal) to dis-
criminate in the school than in the prison or the prosecutor’s
office.  But why should this be so?  It is difficult to see how this
differential is justified from a normative perspective, especially
given what is known about the extent of racial bias in the
criminal justice system.301
More broadly, the doctrine’s prioritization of evidence of
semantic content over circumstantial, statistical, or testimo-
nial evidence acts as a subsidy for anticlassification claims in
relation to claims based on alternate conceptions of discrimi-
natory intent.302  One exception is that anticlassification logic
loses its force in the criminal law context.  This is because the
Court has been unwilling to rule on the constitutionality of
race-based investigative decisions even when they shade into
the use of race as a general proxy for criminal suspicion.303  On
the other side of the ledger, most other claims of discriminatory
intent are set up to fail given the lack of relevant evidentiary
tools.  Again, there is an exception: Where a potentially dis-
criminatory animus or statistical discrimination is the work of
an institutional body, and is challenged through post hoc civil
litigation—think of the affirmative action or the racial gerry-
mandering cases—the Court has been willing to entertain
301 See sources cited supra note 291. R
302 Reva Siegel identifies Washington v. Davis as the origin of this phenome-
non. See Siegel, Equality Divided, supra note 48, at 9, 15–23.  In contrast, I have
argued that it comes later and is a function of the more granular evidence rules
documented in Part III.
303 See supra text accompanying note 238 (citing cases); Huq, supra note 238, R
at 2452–56 (criticizing application of Equal Protection rules in the criminal
context).
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wide-ranging civil discovery to explore how and when imper-
missible classifications have come into play.304
Three more general points emerge from this bird’s-eye
view.  First, the net result of these doctrinal trends is that
legislative bodies are more likely to see their work closely scru-
tinized for bias than executive branch actors.  Second, where
discretionary policy decisions are not executed through written
instructions, but instead via case-by-case determinations (as is
the case with prosecutors often and police almost always), it
will be harder to prove a discriminatory intent.  Third, it is
easier to challenge a non-coercive than a coercive policy (i.e.,
one in the criminal, national security, or immigration contexts),
even though the latter entail more immediate and harmful in-
vasions of bodily integrity and liberty.
All this means that as the context of a discriminatory in-
tent challenge moves from legislative handling of a regulatory
issue to the exercise of dispersed executive discretion over state
coercion, antidiscrimination norms lose their deterrent force.
In part, this means not only that courts are more likely to
enforce anticlassification norms than other conceptions of dis-
criminatory intent.  It also means that the animus and statisti-
cal discrimination conceptions are unevenly and somewhat
erratically implemented.  Hence, what Ian Haney-Lo´pez con-
demns as binary “intentional blindness” to bias against minori-
ties grounded on the deliberate refusal to look inside the
“minds of government officials,” may be understood also as the
results of uneven calibration of different evidentiary
implements.305
This doctrinal arrangement has two troubling implications.
First, it will lead judges to recognize some forms of intent, but
not others, as a predicate to their remediation.  It hence creates
winners and losers among those subject to unconstitutional
discrimination.  The winners will tend to be social majorities.
For the modal form of race-conscious decision-making that is
easiest to challenge under this evidentiary dispensation is the
codified affirmative action program that promotes the interests
of minorities.  Establishments that reflect an explicit prefer-
ence for religious majorities, moreover, are often insulated from
review by a doctrinal lens that focuses on tradition rather than
semantic content.306
304 See sources cited supra note 298.
305 Haney-Lo´pez, supra note 49, at 1853–54. R
306 See supra text accompanying note 245. R
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In contrast, the species of discrimination that matter most
to racial and religious minorities—in particular, the improper
use of discretion by police, prosecutors, and immigration offi-
cials—receive the most circumscribed judicial attention as a
result of doctrines that preclude the acquisition or considera-
tion of the most probative forms of evidence.  It is true that
racial gerrymanders receive more capacious attention and “ho-
listic analysis,”307 but challenges to the use of race in redis-
tricting have an ambiguous distributive effect.  When deployed
like challenges to affirmative action, they are a means to am-
plify as well as limit minority voting power.  As a result, the
evidentiary framework for taking stock of constitutional dis-
criminatory intent tilts against the minority groups and in favor
of racial and religious majorities.  Rather than being counter-
majoritarian, the constitutional law of antidiscrimination
tracks the interest of socially dominant groups with impressive
precision.  It has become an instrument of redistribution from
marginalized minority groups to socially powerful majority
groups—a symptom, rather than a cure, of the pathologies of
hierarchical exclusion that are regrettably common in Ameri-
can history.
Second, the effect of this uneven distribution of judicial
resources does not end with the allocation or denial of reme-
dies.  Courts are not the only means of remedying social
wrongs, but they play a central role in the American context.  In
particular, the Supreme Court has come to play a dominant
role in national life.  It enjoys a deep reservoir of sociological
legitimacy among the American public.308  The Court’s rulings
on constitutional matters—and by implication, the Court’s im-
plicit judgments about what matters and what does not matter
for constitutional compliance—therefore likely shape, at least
to some extent, the public’s understanding of the normatively
freighted question of whether the Constitution is being followed
or violated.309
307 Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 800 (2017).
308 See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public
Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 637 (1992) (documenting
Court’s deep reservoir of public legitimacy); Jeffery J. Mondak & Shannon I.
Smithey, Dynamics of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 57 J. POL. 1114,
1124–25 (1997) (“Public support for the Supreme Court tends to be both high and
stable—aggregate traits that seemingly reveal an institution largely insulated
from short-term shifts in public preferences.”).
309 For evidence of this effect in Establishment Clause cases, see Valerie J.
Hoekstra & Jeffrey A. Segal, The Shepherding of Local Public Opinion: The Supreme
Court and Lamb’s Chapel, 58 J. POL. 1079, 1079, 1096–97 (1996), and Michael A.
Unger, After the Supreme Word: The Effect of McCreary County v. ACLU (2005)
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By selectively shining its spotlight on the existence of dis-
crimination in some domains and not others, the Court helps
define what might be called our common constitutional land-
scape.  This is our shared sense of the landscape of constitu-
tional rights and wrongs that characterize the polity at a given
moment.  Uneven allocation of judicial search expenditures
makes some kinds of wrongs more salient, and hence more
plausible problems for political redress, than others, even if
their salience is not supportable on more empirically robust
grounds.  What follows has been usefully labeled “hermeneuti-
cal injustice” by the philosopher Miranda Fricker.  This is a
phenomenon in which “some significant area of one’s social
experience [is] obscured from collective understanding owing to
persistent and wide-ranging hermeneutical marginaliza-
tion.”310  The doctrine for discovering discriminatory intent, on
this view, does not merely fail to redress extant wrongs.  It also
perpetrates an independent moral harm by reinforcing the
nonrecognition of the wide range of discriminatory harms that
fall predictably on racial and religious minorities.311  In so do-
ing, it may well be that our constitutional doctrine of antidis-
crimination is likely to “induce indifference, fatalism, and
passive injustice.”312 Paradoxically, constitutional equality
doctrine itself may sustain and perpetuate the very structural
inequalities it purports to heal.
One final implication of an emphasis upon the hermeneuti-
cal quality of the Court’s interventions in social life is that the
mechanisms whereby different interest groups can mobilize in
federal court have meaningful distributive consequences.  By
assigning to different factions different shares of the scarce
resource of litigation as a means of focusing public attention,
and Van Orden v. Perry (2005) on Support for Public Displays of the Ten Command-
ments, 36 AM. POL. RES. 750, 766–77 (2008).  For like evidence on gay rights, see
James W. Stoutenborough, Donald P. Haider-Markel & Mahalley D. Allen, Reas-
sessing the Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on Public Opinion: Gay Civil Rights
Cases, 59 POL. RES. Q. 419, 430 (2006), which explains that “Supreme Court
decisions can have a significant impact on public opinion in the area of gay civil
rights.”  For skepticism of this effect, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 424
(2004), which focuses on the school desegregation cases.
310 MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER & THE ETHICS OF KNOWING 154
(2007) (emphasis omitted).  A paradigmatic example is the failure to recognize
sexual harassment until the 1970s. See id. at 149–50.
311 Across American history, for example, racism has been mutative, taking
various forms and flowing variously through both state-sanctioned and social
sinews.  It was “not fully codified into laws” until the twentieth century. GEORGE
M. FREDERICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 100 (rev. ed. 2015).
312 JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 126 (1990).
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the law of Article III standing and the various devices for the
collective resolution of legal questions in federal court ought to
be understood as allocative instruments.  They determine who
can speak, and have become, for better or worse, the gatekeep-
ers of the quintessential American platform for rendering legi-
ble the moral wrongs of society.313
B. Reconstructing the Judicial Toolbox in Discriminatory
Intent Cases
But there is no reason to stick with the current asymme-
tries in doctrinal allocations.  It is possible to imagine an alter-
native doctrinal regime that furnishes a more level playing field
than current arrangements.  The key to this improvement is
implicit in Part III’s argument. I spell it out here in detail.
To begin with, it requires principled and consistent judicial
explanations for the choice among possible conceptions of dis-
crimination.  There are necessarily multiple ways in which race
can figure in government decision-making.  The Court should
acknowledge this diversity and its implications more frankly.
Most importantly, diverse forms of impermissible intent will be
amenable to different kinds of evidentiary approaches.  Current
law, with its lacunae and limitations on evidence acquisition,
implicitly favors some conceptions of unconstitutional intent
over others.  A better approach would involve a frank recogni-
tion on judges’ part of the compelling need for a deep and
diverse evidentiary toolkit in dealing with unconstitutional dis-
crimination.  It would also entail the abolition of the existing
bespoke exceptions, based on deference, hostility to numbers,
or a blinkered conception of the relevant transactional frame.
All relevant, otherwise-admissible evidence should always be
acquired and considered in searching for discriminatory intent.
Categorical exclusions and caveats should be uniformly aban-
doned—including judicial resistance to evidence of uncon-
scious bias and the bench’s culpable failure to account for
pervasive, structural discrimination.
This approach is warranted on more pragmatic grounds
too.  A constitutional rule concerning official intent must cover
a wide range of institutional and policy contexts.  In this re-
gard, it is dissimilar from elements of the Bill of Rights that
speak to the discrete and relatively isolated phenomenon such
313 My aim here has not been to explain how these asymmetries arose, but it is
perhaps worth noting that majoritarian capture of the instruments of progressive
redistribution to redress historical injustices is nothing particularly new in Ameri-
can history.
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as the criminal trial.314  An intent-based regime under either
the Equal Protection Clause or the Religion Clause must be
flexible enough to apply to collective bodies of legislators, citi-
zens engaged in lawmaking through initiatives or referenda,
apex officials (such as governors and presidents) charged with
the formulation of general policy, and also line-level officials
(such as police officers and prosecutors) responsible for the
front-line interactions between the state and members of the
polity.  Moreover, the Constitution’s protection of vulnerable
minorities extends across different policy domains.  Most im-
portantly, it applies to both coercive and noncoercive policy
choices.
This institutional and policy variety means that there will
inevitably be heterogeneity of institutional form so far as con-
stitutional antidiscrimination rules are concerned.  Each dis-
tinct institutional actor has its own processes for deliberating
on facts and law.  Each has its own devices for intervening in
the world.  It is not plausible to think that the same version of
discriminatory intent, and the same instruments for isolating
such intent, will be relevant in the thick of street policing, the
struggle of legislators to carve up new districts, and the efforts
of administrators and teachers to allocate educational re-
sources fairly and efficiently.  Given this variety, it is not sensi-
ble to constrain artificially the choice of evidentiary
instruments.  Rather, the full toolkit for discovering discrimi-
natory intent recognized in Arlington Heights should avail with
no categorical exclusions or presumptions of disfavor.
There is, nevertheless, one arguable exception to this logic
in relation to the judicial review of legislative action.  This con-
cerns judicial reliance on voters’ preferences.  It is extremely
hard in most instances to connect voters’ preferences on a
specific policy to their action in the voting booth, and then to
the behavior of elected actors.  The analysis of polling data can
point toward a rough demographic profile of a majority coali-
tion.315  But even sophisticated analysis will not, except in the
314 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defence.”).
315 See Jonathan T. Rothwell & Pablo Diego-Rosell, Explaining Nationalist Po-
litical Views: The Case of Donald Trump 1 (November 2, 2016), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2822059 (finding that “living in racially isolated communities with worse
health outcomes, lower social mobility, less social capital, greater reliance on
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most unusual cases of single-issue campaigns, isolate public
sentiments on specific issues.  Moreover, many people in prac-
tice rely on their religious convictions when voting.316  Ac-
counting for these preferences in a constitutional calculus
might constrict legitimate public political deliberation in un-
tenable ways.317  Accordingly, it will ordinarily be the case that
evidence of voters’ intentions will not be relevant to an under-
standing of the “intent” of a law in this context.318
But this exclusion may well not be problematic.  In con-
trast to most administrative actions or exercises of executive
discretion, legislators’ actions tend to be relatively public and
high visibility.  Well-developed arrangements for lobbying and
influencing legislators also already exist.  It might hence be
thought that legislation (as opposed to executive actors, espe-
cially when dispersed and relatively unsupervised) requires the
least constitutional supervision.  As a result, exclusion of one
source from which to infer the motive behind legislation is not
problematic.
Otherwise, however, the time is ripe to return to a more
evenhanded and catholic evidentiary apparatus in grappling
with the many varieties of discriminatory intent barred under
the Equal Protection and Religion Clauses.
CONCLUSION
The granular ways of implementing grand, abstract ideas
such as ‘discriminatory intent’ turn out to be highly conse-
quential on the ground.  They shape the practical sense of con-
stitutional guarantees.  My aim here has been to tease out an
array of clashing and contesting ideas that lie behind that
seemingly unitary concept of discriminatory intent.  Such con-
ceptual diversity might well be beneficial, if it works to capture
the various ways in which impermissible classifications find
their way into government decision-making.  Yet we must take
care to avoid an evidentiary apparatus that skews the alloca-
social security income and less reliance on capital income, predicts higher levels
of Trump support”).
316 See Brad Lockerbie, Race and Religion: Voting Behavior and Political Atti-
tudes, 94 SOC. SCI. Q. 1145, 1155 (2013) (finding that “there are meaningful
differences [in voting] across religious groups in the United States”).
317 For an illuminating treatment, see Kent Greenawalt, Religion and Public
Reasons: Making Laws and Evaluating Candidates, 27 J.L. & POL. 387, 405
(2012), who writes that “[f]or many people, their religious convictions and affilia-
tion are an important part of who they are.”
318 An exception to this resistance may be warranted when the public is moti-
vated by animus. See supra text accompanying note 144. R
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tion of judicial resources away from some deserving litigants
toward others.  Achieving that level playing field requires no
dramatic doctrinal fix.  What it entails is rather a return to the
appropriately capacious and flexible way in which the Court
initially proposed to discover unconstitutional discriminatory
intent when that notion first seized the Justices’ imagination.
It is, therefore, a rare instance that justifies a return to first
principles by appeal to forward-looking considerations.
